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Abstract

This thesis sets out to determine possible links between the
depleting water resources in Israel and the country's hegemony over the
water-rich area of south Lebanon. The early Zionist and later Israeli
leaders have coveted the Litani river of Lebanon, to which Israel has
had access since 1978. Israel's replenishable water stock is being
fully utilized. This fact is the basis of the theoretical motif of the
thesis, namely state conflict induced by resource scarcity. Thus
conflict theory is discussed and a model of conflict process is
derived.
Also discussed are 1) the reasons for the high water consumption in
Israel, 2) water supply and demand in the country, 3) the degradation
of fresh water sources, and 4) the domestic and foreign options
available for Israel to
ameliorate the impending water crisis.
Lebanon's Litani river is seen as Israel's best answer to its water
problem.
A diversion of the Litani into the Jordan river would,
however, strongly affect the economic and demographic growth in both
Lebanon and Israel. Such a diversion would also have destabilising
regional implications, especially for Lebanon. Against this background
the conflict model is tested, and a revised one is proposed; one that
is more reflective of the conflict process while under conditions of
"natural" scarcity. In conclusion, there appears to be a hydrological
dimension to Israel's presence in the "security belt" of south Lebanon.

i

Acknowledgements

I am deeply inde'bted to my father, Al Haj Abu Ghazi, who long ago,
fueled my curiosity about Israel's interest in the Litani River of
Lebanon. My Sincere thanks go to Dr. Atif Kubursi of McMaster
University who was first to encourage this research, and to Dr. Brent
Hall of Wilfrid Laurier University who patiently supervised the
process. It was Dr. Hall's thorough readings of the early drafts and
his frank comments and concern for the underlying logic of my writing
that contributed much to the coherence and consistency of this thesis.
I am deeply grateful to the encouragement and contributions of Dr.
Kenneth Hewitt and of Dr. Jerry Hall of Wilfrid Laurier University. I
am also grateful to Dr. Atif Kubursi's generous and constructive
comments, and for consenting to be a reader of this thesis.
Vital to the successful completion of this paper was the invaluable
literature supplied by: Dr. S. Pohorlyes of the Ministry of Agriculture
in Israel; Dr. T.C. NiblocK of Exeter University; and by my brother
Ma'an Amery at the Arab University of Beirut. And not least, I would
like to acknowledge the comments of Dr. Gwyn Rowley of Sheffield
University, and Ms. Pam Carnochan's patient assistance in producing her
excellent cartographic work that appears in this thesis.

11

Table of Contents
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

1

CHAPTER TWO: THE CAUSES, PROCESSES, AND RESOLUTION OF
CONFLICT: A THEORETICAL APPROACH

6

2.1
2.2
2.3

2.4
2.5

Preliminary Definition of Conflict
Causes of International Conflict
Conflict Evolution
2.3.1 An Introduction
2.3.2 The Process of Conflict
Conflict Resolution
Summary

CHAPTER THREE: AN HISTORICAL BACKGROUND TO
THE LITANI RIVER DISPUTE
3.1 The Early Historical Period: 1905-1948
3.2 The Period of 1948-1966
3.3 - The Period of 1967-1978
3.4 Summary
CHAPTER FOUR: THE HYDRO-POLITICS OF SOUTH LEBANON. ...
4.1

4.2

4.3

4.4

4.5

The Geographical Setting
4.1.1 Israel
4.1.2 Lebanon
Israel's High Water Consumption: An Analysis.
4.2.1 Demography and Culture
4.2.2 Zionism and Agriculture
l
The Economic Viability
of Subsidised Agriculture
n.
Ideology and Israel's Water
Water Policy
Passive Acquisition of New Water Resources.
4.3.1 The Domestic Prescription
l.
Water Desal mization
u.
Cloud Seeding
ill. Recycling Waste Water
4.3.2 The Foreign Prescription
l.
The Nile River, The Negev Desert.
and Peace
The Litani River and Israel's Water Problems.
4.4.1 Water Quantity
4.4.2 Water Quality
Geopolitical Analysis of Water Scarcity. ...

111

7
8
14
14
16
30
35

38
39
44
49
54
55
56
56
57
60
60
64
65
66
70
71
71
73
73
75
75
78
78
82
83

4.5.1
4.5.2

The Value of Water to Israel
The Value of Water to Lebanon
i.
The Litani Project
ii. The Problems of Irrigation
iii. Water as a Factor of Stability.
iv. Current and Future Water Needs. ..
4.6 Summary
CHAPTER FIVE: ANALYSIS OF CONFLICT THEORY AND
WATER SCARCITY
5.1 The Latent Water Conflict
5.2 Conflict Initiation and Active Awareness. ..
5.3 The Balancing of Power and Israel's
Response to the Water Crisis
5.4 A Security Belt or a Hydrologic One?
5.4.1 The Security-related Scenario
5.4.2 The Water-related Scenario
5.5 A Revised Model of Conflict Process
5.5.1 The Time Factor in The Conflict
Process
5.5.2 A Triggered Conflict or an
Onsetting One?
5.5.3 Status-quo Testing and The Structure
of Expectations
5.6 Summary

83
87
87
89
90
93
93

95
96
98
100
101
101
103
106
107
109
110
114

CHAPTER SIX: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

117

BIBLIOGRAPHY

121

iv

4.5.1
4.5.2

The Value of Water to Israel
The Value of Water to Lebanon
i.
The Litani Project
ii. The Problems of Irrigation
iii. Water as a Factor of Stability.
iv. Current and Future Water Needs. ..
4.6 Summary
CHAPTER FIVE: ANALYSIS OF CONFLICT THEORY AND
WATER SCARCITY
5.1 The Latent Water Conflict
5.2 Conflict Initiation and Active Awareness. ..
5.3 The Balancing of Power and Israel's
Response to the Water Crisis
5.4 A Security Belt or a Hydrologic One?
5.4.1 The Security-related Scenario
5.4.2 The Water-related Scenario
5.5 A Revised Model of Conflict Process
5.5.1 The Time Factor in The Conflict
Process
5.5.2 A Triggered Conflict or an
Onsetting One?
5.5.3 Status-quo Testing and The Structure
of Expectations.
5.6 Summary

83
87
87
89
90
93
93

95
96
98
100
101
101
103
106
107
109
110
114

CHAPTER SIX: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

117

BIBLIOGRAPHY

121

iv

List of Tables

Table
Table
Table
Table
Table

4.1
4.2
4.3
4.4
4.5

Table 4.6

Sources of Population Increase in Israel.
_ Jewish Immigration by Continent of Origin.
Comparative Water Consumption
Water Consumption In Israel
Irrigated and Irrigable Area
Requirements for Lebanon
Available Water Supply and Projected
Demand for Lebanon

61
61
63
64
92
92

List of Figures

Figure 2.1

The Process of Conflict Model

Figure 2.2

Conflict Process: The Balancing
of Power Phase
The Basin of the Jordan and Litani
Rivers
Revised Process of Conflict Model

Figure 4.1
Figure 5.1
Figure 5.2
Figure 5.3

A Detailed Section of the Conflict
Process: The Enhanced Model
Map of The Security Belt in South
Lebanon

v

18
23
58
108

112
'... . 104

C H A P T E R

ONE

Introduction

One

of

the

most

essential to health,
and

vital

to

life

is water.

It is

agriculture, energy, industry, transportation,

recreation; in short,

viability

resources

to human existence,

and prosperity of

states.

and to the economic

This makes

water a strategic

resource, especially to states in arid regions.
The

climate

semi-arid,
latter.

of

most

countries

or a combination

of both.

Prior to the establishment

of water was of perennial

of

Lebanon's

tributaries.

Litani

Zionist

the

Middle East is arid,

Israel

is an example of the

of Israel in 1948, the question

importance to the Zionist founders of the

state. They sought the borders
most

in

of the Jewish state-to-be to- include

river,

the

Jordan

demands were, however, not

United Nations partitioned Palestine in

river

and all its

realized when the

1947 into an Arab state and

a Jewish one.
Many
partition

Arab

states

as a first

believe

that

step towards the

1

the

Zionists

accepted

the

creation of an Eretz Israel

(i.e. the Land of Israel stretching from the Nile to the Euphrates).
Arab fears of an alleged Israeli expansionist policy were compounded
by

pronouncements of Israeli

leaders in, for

government's Year Book (1951: 402)
we

reached the

country."
not

do.

beginning of

It then added
We

have

set

expansion" (1951:
Dayan in

which states that "Only now have

independence in

that "... to
up

example, the Israeli

a

a part

maintain the status quo will

dynamic

state

state

419). A similar pronouncement

the 1960s when he declared

of our small

bent upon ...

was made by Moshe

that Israel's northern borders

are "not satisfactory" (Naff and Matson, 1984).
The Arab states' fears of the expansionist nature of Israel were
confirmed after the June War of 1967; a War in which Israel occupied
territories from three of her four neighbouring states, thus greatly
enlarging the area of the once-small country.
these

expansionist

invaded
in

tendencies

Lebanon and established

the southern part

affairs
officials

was

of

south

is

in 1978 when Israel

the so-called "security belt/zone"
Israel's involvement in the

viewed

as a hydro-strategic

the expropriation

rekindled

of the country.

Lebanon

The Arab concern over

by

many

Arab and Lebanese

step that would

of south Lebanon and the

ultimately lead to

diversion of the Litani

river into Israel.
Since the
its

1960s Israel's water needs

successive territorial

dwindling

water

supplies,

(2)

strategic

significance of

gains which

supplies.
its

need

Due
to

to

access

supplemented the country's

Israel's

(1) depleting water

new sources of water, (3) the

the resource,

2

have been paralleled with

and (4)

the geopolitical

realities

in the

inevitable

Middle East,

course

of

a

territorial expansionism becomes an

water-deficient,

advantaged, and largely

isolated state of Israel.
The
between

objective of this
water

scarcity

thesis is to
in

the

determine the relationship

Middle

East and the Arab-Israeli

conflict, in particular that between Lebanon and Israel.
of this
by

objective, the hydrologic dimension

proxy

maintains

of

the

so-called

that this zone

resources

This

south

Lebanon,

is explored. Israel

protect its northern region

research suggests that the "hidden"

this zone is to "secure"

of

of Israel's occupation

zone"

is needed to

from "terrorist" attacks.
objective of

"security

In pursuit

the

Israel's access to the water

most

important of which is the

Litani river.
Israe-1's
the

aggressive policy

conceptual

resources.

framework

of

A model describing

towards south
conflict

between states over scarce

the process of conflict is developed

and tested in the context of water scarcity.
of

an analysis

which aims

Lebanon is tested in

to derive

This becomes the basis

a refined

model that can be

employed to determine the general geo-political impacts of onsetting
resource scarcities.
An analysis

of Israel's water policy

accurately

the country's

economic,

and

perhaps

hydro-strategic planning,
territorial

factors/objectives are clearly
conflict

can be better

is essential to interpret

objectives.

its political,
Once

these

understood, the broader Arab-Israeli

understood; perhaps leading

solution to the larger conflict.

3

to a realistic

The literature that has
conflict"

is

devoid

of

been written on the "Arab-Israeli water
either

quantitative

socio-political background to the problem.
is

devoid

of

a

theoretical

framework

data

or

of

the

Moreover, the literature
that

could

explain

the

geopolitical implications of state competition for scarce resources.
Hence,

the

primarily

methodological
descriptive,

approach

used

supplemented

by

in

this

research

is

data from the statistical

abstract of Israel, and authors on the water resources of the Middle
East.
demands

There
and

are

no

recent

supplies.

Thus

governmental data on Lebanon's water
the

data

are

from

writers

on the

hydrology of Lebanon, and from recent articles that appeared on this
subject in Lebanese newspapers and magazines.
Following
discussion

the

introduction

of conflict

discussion includes
focal

point of

chapter

theory, its

this

thesis

is

evolution and processes.

a model of conflict

the theoretical

of

a

This

process, which becomes the

discussion and

analysis.

Chapter

Three provides a historical background to the water conflict between
Lebanon

and

Israel

tracing

presents an analysis of water
Israel.

The

latter

it

this chapter.

country's

significance

of the

conflict theory
refined

It also

model of

1905 to 1978.

Chapter Four

supply and demand in both Lebanon and
need

specifically the Litani river of
of

from

for

new

water

resources,

Lebanon, are two of the objectives

establishes the

Litani river

to Lebanon.

and the conceptual model
conflict process

economic and political
Chapter Five tests

presented, earlier, thus a

is derived.

A summary

of the

thesis and a number of conclusions are presented in Chapter Six.

4

This thesis
of

confirms the partial applicability

conflict model in

situations of resource

refined model is derived.
are

also

hostilities

confirmed
between

to

of the process

scarcity from which a

The hydrological riches of south Lebanon
be

Lebanon

a

contributing factor to the state of
and

Israel,

occupation by proxy of the "security zone."

5

and

to

the

latter's

C H A P T E R

TWO

The Causes, Processes, and Resolution
of Conf1ict.
A Theoretical Approach

The purpose of this chapter
within

which

analysed.
than

international

conflict

The concept of conflict

the common

1976,

is to present the theoretical approach

usage of

1977, 1979,

its

developments

can

be

is far more dynamic and complicated

the term

and 1981)

and

implies.

has written,

Dr.

R.J. Rummel (1975,

for example, a five volume

series on Understanding Conf1ict and War, and innumerable other writers
have broached the issue on both the micro and macro levels.
In this
and then

chapter, the concept of "conflict"

the causes and contributing factors

analysed.

Also

discussed

conflict.

The

conclusion

resolution.

are

the

discusses

will first be defined,
to it are systematically

various evolutionary phases of a
various

approaches to conflict

The theoretical framework discussed here is also a testing

ground for the subsequent case study and how well it fits the theory of
conf1ict.

6

2.1 Preliminary Definition of Conflict
Throughout

this thesis,

the word

state is

used as a 'short hand

expression.' Depending upon the context

in which it is used, state may

refer

behalf

to

those

influencing
entity

these

(Levi,

influences

making

decisions,

1960:

its

decisions

411).

behavior

on

or

all

The

in

the

state

the

people, those

citizens of the political

is

identifying

of

future-oriented and this

future

goals

(eg.

future

resource needs) and working towards them (Choucn and North, 1975).

As

a result, and for the sake of consistency and convenience, the state is
adopted as the basic unit of analysis in the thesis.
Most

studies

international

of

the

conflict

domestic/family

between

of

but

for the

concepts such as "spouses"

social

"values and norms"

"state

ranks".
in the

conflict

states

conflicts. Therefore,

coherent-theory,

maintained

theory

This

is

discussion. Albeit

with

purpose of

with
or

deriving a

essential

"class and status" by
so that consistency is

rare, there

are shadows

nature of conflict theory, and

factors that contribute to

deal

urban/social

analytical discourse apparent in parts of this chapter.
the interdisciplinary

not

are replaced by "states",

by "ideologies", and

approach

do

of an

This is due to
the scope of the

the actual manifestations of conflict. This

led scholars like Fink (1968)

and Boulding (1957) to assert that there

cannot be a single, one dimensional theory of conflict.
Disputes

are

defined

by

Rummel

(1979)

as "felt grievances" by

states capable of waging war. But when military options are introduced,
disputes become conflicts. Rummel goes on to define conflict as

7

the subset of all disputes between parties capable of waging
war in which the military option has been introduced, and at
least one party perceives the issues at stake in partially,
if not wholly, military terms (Barringer, 1972 as quoted by
Rummel, 1979: 190).
It is assumed that two or more
pursue

the

same

objective,

hence leading them to acts
The

states are in conflict if and when they
making

their interests incompatible and

or gestures of hostility toward each other.

incompatible objectives

may involve:

competition over markets or

physical resources; territorial disputes; control over human resources;
or they may involve aspirational issues (Dowty and Kochan, 1976: 4 3 ) .
A

conflict,

then,

must

include

one

or

more

of the following

characteristics: 1) Acts of political subversion, directed by a foreign
power,

that do

not normally

violate the

state; 2) economic imposition
or blockades;

3) verbal accusations or attacks,
to

or

manoeuvres,

exercises,

action that

is deemed threatening in some

confrontation which

the targeted

which could include sanctions, boycotts,

retaliate,

more states.

boundaries of

continue

attacking;

mobilization,

can be a limited or

or

4)

threats to attack, or
non-violent

authorization

of

military
military

way; and 5) direct military
full-scale war between two or

These are the main ingredients of a conflict. But what is

the process that leads to and causes tension and violent conflict?
2.2 Causes of International Conflict.
Conflict
Choucri

and

is viewed
North

as a

(1975)

direct outcome

and

North

of growth.

(1977),

the

root

According to
causes

of

international conflict are directly related to a blend of the following
factors:

firstly,

conditions

growth, and the external

of

internal

demographic

and economic

expansion of interests; secondly, competition

8

for resources,
Global

markets, superiority in arms,

demographic

continuous
demands

growth,

improvement

of

for -additional

needs and desires.
to national

technological
living

resources

mankind has had to employ

and strategic advantage.
advancements,

standards
and

have

finished

and

the

all led to higher
goods. As a result,

larger amounts of energy to satisfy material

This growth has been governed and managed according

priorities, which are influenced

of resources, both material and

by government allocation

human (Choucri and North, 1975). These

resources in turn shape national capabilities.
Capabilities
military

of a country

force, as

well as

infrastructure, labour
base.

include, naturally, all
the country's

aspects of its

light and heavy industrial

needs, and among other

things, an agricultural

In this context, Choucri and North (1975: 16) note that

When
demands are unmet
and existing capabilities are
insufficient to satisfy them, new capabilities may have to be
developed. But a society can develop particular capabilities
(including resources) only if it has the necessary existing
capabilities to do so. Moreover, if national capabilities
cannot be attained at a reasonable cost within national
boundaries, they may be sought beyond.
Capability-building activities resulting from the pressures of domestic
growth

more

often

than

not

territory. This is referred to
pressure"

while

"expansionism".

the

more

It is usually

necessitate

expansion

into

foreign

by Choucri and North (1977) as "lateral
common

term

for

expressed in real

such

activities

is

terms as an external

expansion of interest on a territorial, social or economic level.
A multitude
These

of factors may induce a

factors are

largely dependent

that are not being satisfied

state to pursue expansionism.

upon the

"nature of the demands

domestically and on the capabilities that

9

are available"

(Choucri and North, 1975:

17). Expansion of interests

usually occurs when national demands are growing in the face of limited
resources; a situation where
demands in one way

the government feels compelled to satisfy

or another. Furthermore, (territorial) expansionism

is a function of a country's need to protect its current or anticipated
trade

routes, or

access to

strategic resources

and minerals (North,

1977).
»

As

mentioned

earlier,

future-oriented. Moreover,

the

state

and

its

a state which is

resource

needs

are

accepting of or satisfied

with the status quo at one point in time, may not necessarily be in the
same

position in

between
may

the future.

international actors.

shift,

new

ideologies

innovations

and

developments

Therefore, "conflict
Leaders may

may

may remain latent

change, domestic interests

become ascendent," and technological

may

alter

relative

capabilities

and

domestic demands of states (Rummel, 1979: 167). A good example of this
change
the

of orientation is

first

ten

years

country's

domestic

population

growth

initial

accommodate

after

demands
and

boundaries.

the massive Jewish

its

the

establishment

rose

sharply

strategic

This pressure

growth was

immigration to Israel in

as

of

state. The

a

result of the rapid

interests

expanded beyond the

from within to

partly to

that

blame for

expand in order to

the Jordan river dispute

which in turn contributed to the 1967 Six Day War (Stauffer, 1982; Hof,
1985).
Knowing that

growth is a continuous

that states are future-oriented in

process, .and having mentioned

their outlook, the latency of state

attitudes take on particular importance.

10

Such attitudes are defined or

governed

by

the

rate

of

growth,

capabilities, the rank of the states

severity

of

needs,

level

of

involved, or by a number of other

less significant factors.
Each country has a
to

differ in their

specific latent attitude. States, however, tend

ways of expressing

their latent "ends, wants, and

goals, and the means to achieve them. Within the structure of conflict,
these attitudes are inactive; they are dispositional forces waiting for
stimulation"
embodied
may

(Rummel,

1979:

in state relations

be manifested

in a

162).

Latent

conflict

and activated by

number of

demand of a certain good or

attitudes

are

change. These attitudes

ways such

as: 1)

by skyrocketing

resource; 2) by political change where new

ideologies (political or religious) become a dominant force; and 3) due
to technological advancements
become

a-ltered and

larger.

whereby societies' perceptions of "need"

their demands

Therefore, and as

for more

Coser (1957: 64)

and better

things become

noted, "Change, no matter

what its source, breeds strain and conflict."
Competition for

human and natural resources,

a better standard of

living, and stronger trade links are converging and inevitable paths in
the

development of a

existence

and

state.

prosperity.

Such competition
Quincy

Wright

is crucial for states'

(1951)

asserts that in a

competition,

The successful nations grow and prosper; the unsuccessful
decline. It is true that, because nations are geographically
circumscribed and immovable, this competition may induce
efforts to expand territory at the expense of others, and
thus lead to conflict. This, however," Wright claims, "is a
product of civilization" and not a Darwinian "struggle for
existence" from which "only the fittest survives" (198).

11

A

society

that

industrialization

is

often

facing

faces

population

pressures

of

growth

and

rapid

limited or insufficient

resources. These problems are usually solved peacefully where the state
imports

the necessary

research projects.
and

their supply

resources or

But if the
is only

invests in

related technological

demand for resources is a strategic one

located in

a handful of (possibly hostile)

countries, the problem then takes on a whole different dimension.
Like competition, international links
survival and prosperity of a
sanctions

are

often

state. This is why blockades, boycotts or

viewed

by

the

inflicted state as acts of war.

Coercive foreign policy decisions are
resource
North

scarcity.

Such reaction

expected-. After

all, a shortage of

minerals,

eventually

making
such

the state
example.

The

were

coerced

Japan,

lead

vulnerable.

sometimes taken as a response to

of a state

Atlantic Treaty Organization

will

or NATO) is

the

or an alliance (eg. The
only normal and to be

resources, especially of strategic
to

The

the decline of state capability,
1973 Arab

oil-dependent West,
by

are essential factors in the

Arab

oil embargo is just one

especially Western Europe and

states to reconsider their "blind

support" for Israel and to follow a more "balanced" foreign policy path
in the Middle East.
realize

its

But does every state have the option to coercively

objectives?

And,

when

does

such

a

policy

become

imperative?
Despite
political),

possible

ethnic,

ideological

and aspirational commonalities

have vast differences in

(both

religious

and

between states, they often

economic wealth, socio-economic and political

prestige, and in their military

and political capability (which may be
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peaceful

or

coercive).

Therefore,

ranking of each country based on
state's

"field of

there

is

an

accepted implicit

a set of positive-valued aspects of a

expression"; meaning

its capability (Rummel, 1977:

197).
The

concepts of

"fields" and

modern states to some extent
one

advances,

although
Jewish

the

other

are described by Rummel as opposites; "as
must

the United Nations
state, the

territory

recede"

newly founded

into the Arab

sector.

of the larger and established
is a

good indicator

(1977: 15-17).

partitioned Palestine into

territorial base several times.

state

"antifields" which characterize all

For example,
an Arab and a

Jewish army

of Israel

expanded its

Since then,

Israel has expanded its

Therefore, Israel became the antifield

Arab field.
of the

The international rank of a

possibilities that it may consider

coercive-policies if competed against for resources or markets or if it
is inflicted with a resource

shortage.

Ranking is a relative concept,

and in this case a country's rank is relative to its "antifield".
Antifields are determined by interests, and influenced by distances
and

diverse

wills,

economic

various political ranks.
system of

disparities

states

States

often

must
try

attend
to

to

and by

For this dynamic system to

both internal and external pressures.

accommodate

their

states' interests overlap or coincide,
of cooperation.

expectations,

Therefore, a state is a space where a complex

balance of power is maintained.

exist,

and

demands peacefully, so when

we then have a resultant vector

But if states' interests

differ, the resultant vector

is one of coercion (Rummel, 1977; 1979).
States,

like

people,

can

be

13

classified

as

advantaged

or

disadvantaged
those

who

greater

in terms

obey

and

of those

who command

and lead, contrasted to

follow.

The

advantaged

power

(ie.

economic,

authoritative

states usually have a
socio-political,

and

military) than the disadvantaged

ones. Clearly, advantaged states have

a

can

coercive

capability

confrontations,

or

commodity

Arab

Therefore,

(eg.

which

covertly
oil

and

state ranking is

those with the potential to
quo (Rummel, 1977).
to

such

a state, and

be
as

South

a

Africa's

a way of

in

open

deterrence force or
strategic

minerals).

arranging conflict groups among

disrupt, or maintain and defend the status

what it can

that

achieved

explicitly through

don't

lay claim to

trigger

change.

ongoing conflict interaction between

Although

status

quo

may be

documents, or even

and wife), it often is not. The
states (like "trade wars") is the

which they understand their

be claimed and on

— i e . the acceptable state

treaties, contractual

verbal agreements (say between husband

what can

owning

overtly

Here the status quo is used to define what belongs

accesses

process through

wielded

rights, know their space,

the other hand, what

is likely to trigger

conflict in the system — t h e conflict threshold.

2.3 Conflict Evolution
2.3.1 An Introduction
According to Rummel (1979: 192), conflicts among states are usually
of a

particular type, namely "a clash

'theirs'".

An example

of this

is the

of convictions about 'ours' and
Arab-Israeli conflict over the

boundaries of historic Palestine and how much of it belongs to whom.
The seeds of tension-inducing conflict are sown when the status quo
is disturbed putting

a state in a position compelled

14

to respond to an

outside request, demand, or
sovereignty

or

international

challenge. When important issues — s a y , of

rights,

image—

national

are

demands

raised,

the

or

interests,

or

of

challenged state must take a

stand and respond. Ignoring such challenges gives credence to the other
claim

or argument, and

the state
1979).

in the process,

to protect its own
An

Argentina

example
over

of

the

rights or to defend

this

Falkland

islands in the South Atlantic,
islands,
decades

located off

remnants of
the

is

the

London.

and

Britain and
other smaller

just north of Antarctica.
shores of

by Britain.

On

between

islands

the other

These remote

Argentina, have for many

The islands,

the fading British Empire, were

Crown in

its claims (Rummel,

conflict

(Malvinas)

the eastern

been controlled

it weakens the credibility of

which are in fact

more or less forgotten by

hand, Argentina, which once held

these islands, decided

unilaterally to "re-establish" sovereignty over

them.

1980s,

In

the

government,
television

early

appointed

an

broadcasts to

administrator,
the contested

the British government which,
arranged negotiations with the
side

was prepared

Argentina,

then
and

led

by

initiated

islands.

a

military
radio

and

These moves enraged

through mediators, got into some hastily
Argentinians, but to no avail.

to compromise

their position

Neither

hence the escalating

tensions quickly erupted into a war.
Here

is

a

sovereignty;

of

international
state were

case
a

of

a

historic

image and

disrupted
claim;

status of

status quo due to violation of
and

of

a country.

incompatible with those of

a

challenge

The interests

to

the

of one

its "neighbour". An Argentinian

victory would have 1) meant greater domestic support for that country's
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military government; and 2) it would have dealt Britain's international
image

a serious

blow. Thus

Britain felt

compelled to

respond.

The

relative speed

in which this conflict escalated

into a war is perhaps

not

Having

of

typical.

said

that,

the

stages

opposing

claims,

negotiations, threats of reprisals, violent conflict (or w a r ) , conflict
resolution,

and

then

a

return

to

the

status

quo

are

the basic

evolutionary stages of any conflict and its resolution.
The preceding pages and particularly this section, have illustrated
the theory
context

of conflict and identified its

for

the

theory,

the

next

parameters.

Having set the

stage discusses the evolutionary

process of conflict.

2.3.2

The Process of Conflict

Change is
Change,
create

be

an inescapable development in the
it

political,

tensions which

religious,

have the

dispute.

If they

escalate

to

fail, a

bitter

economic,

potential of

Diplomats or mediators may be able to

The

dependent

upon the

honor and

credibility or international image

The

latter is

formerly passive

influenced by

escalating to conflict.

either stagnate

evolution

"importance of

or social, tends to

pre-empt or put a quick end to a

conflict may

levels.

evolution of a state.

of

a dispute is greatly

interests engaged,"

who the

the impact on

(Rummel, 1979: 192-193).

parties to

neighbour, a competitor, or

unsolved, or

the conflict are; a

an enemy.

Rummel (1976:

265) breaks down the process of conflict into five phases:
The first is the transformation of socio-cultural
space into opposing interests. The second involves
choice to manifest opposing interests and a
situation of uncertainty.
The third is the
balancing of powers, may be manifested as conflict

16

(conflict)
the will's
consequent
resulting
behaviour.

Figure 2.1

THE PROCESS OF CONFLICT
Resolution

I

Latent

!

Conflict

V

State; ideology;
values; status.
Opposing attitudes.

Conflict

Phase

Conflict manifest.
Trigger/ disruptors^

Disrupted
Expectations

Initiation

Change; awareness;
manifest of
opposing interests.

Situation
of uncertainty;
Will-to-conflict;
preparations.

Disruption

Incremental change
in new structure
of expectations.

Balancing

of Power

Coercive:
non coercive:
accomodations

Source: Adapted from Rummel, 1 9 7 6

Balance

of Power

Credibility:
interest:
capability

Status quo;
New structure
of expectations.

manifesting their interests coercively or cooperatively.
According
when

to Rummel (1976:

states

evolving

become

aware

interests

dissemination
political,

of

or

268), a conflict

of

and

their

needs.

information

economic

exchanges

which need not be realistic,

own and others long standing or

Awareness

which

begins to take shape

can

develops

be

with

manifest

through
by

the

cultural,

one another. This awareness,

has the ability to transform the hitherto

veiled opposition into an opposing attitude.
In

an

trying to

attempt

to

further

self-interest,

one becomes active in

influence the attitudes and perceptions

of others —

say of

one's own superior or wife,

political and religious groups or figures,

or

When states have

of entire populations.

another

it

is

largely

misinformation.
government
claimed

accused

Libya

of

propaganda,

in

the

spring

the bombing

troops stationed

leaked by

indoctrination
of

White House

of a

and/or

1986 the American

sponsoring state terrorism.

was behind

by American
was later

to

example,

that Tripoli

frequented
evidence

For

due

false perceptions of one

Washington

Berlin night club

in that city
officials.

"Irrefutable"
Based

on this

evidence which apparently incriminated Libya, American bombers attacked
various targets in
West Berlin,

Libya. A few months later, and

Syria emerged as the facilitater

in a court trial in

of the initial bombing.

The Manchester Guardian Weekly (28 December 1986: 16) noted that

The American people now know, also, that some of the case
against Libya consisted of "disinformation" leaked by the
administration and unwittingly published by the press.
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In spite of the American-Libyan fiasco, it must be noted that even when
states

are aware of

each other and

may not feel compelled or

of their opposing interests, they

pressured toward a confrontation or conflict

(Wright, 1951).
States'
becomes

attitudes are actualized

or induces mutually

are nonactive.
269).

security,

opposing attitudes.

They are dispositions without

Attitudes are

resources,

their

stimulated and

concern

over

or even political

"into

vectors

of

"Attitudes, however,

strength" (Rummel, 1976:

translated by

territorial

states' needs for

sovereignty,

prestige. States' needs

that activates attitudes and
then

through awareness which, itself,

national

become the force

transforms them into actual interests and

power"

(Rummel,

1976:

269). Therefore, an

interest that was once latent is being actively pursued now.
At

this early

stage of

conflict evolution,

one can say that the

evolving but hitherto stable interests lead to one states' awareness of
each

other, and

of their

evolving interests

incompatible interests.

of states are underscored,

This is where the

and their new attitudes

are developed.
Phase Two: Conflict Initiation.
This phase moves conflict
and

overt

actions

set

conflicting

interests

state

its

(ie.

the desired

objective

sense

and

Israel

are

economy,

realizing

Syria

the

of

into the opposition stage.
stage
always

army,

for

preparing
emergency

objective. These
uncertainty"

have

this
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Countries with

both the people and the
faci1ities.. .etc.) toward

preparations "are

(Rummel,

different

phase.

Preparations

made in an

1976: 271). For example,

sets of incompatible interests for

which

both states

are always

preparing their

population to initiate

conflict to fulfill their objectives.
A conflict is initiated when (1) the states or individuals involved
have the will-to-conflict or
(2)

when

there

expressed,
conflict
1979);

exists

a

to manifest their opposing interests, and
triggering

opposing interests
hence

a

initiating

step

that

event

move states

"active

activates

(Rummel,

further in

opposition"

events.

An

1976).

Once

the process of

(Rummel, 1976; 1977;

example

of that is the

assassination of the Philippino opposition leader, Benino Acquino. This
was

the

triggering

event

of

the

active

opposition

of the ruling

government which eventually led to the ousting of Ferdinand Marcos.
States
interests

are

usually

by open

hesitant

conflict as

to

manifest

this involves

their

incompatible

uncertainties and risks

which must be carefully considered. A prerequisite to any decision that
may lead to the initiation of

open conflict is a careful evaluation of

the

such

benefits

and

costs

overwhelmed and biased by
all

states

invaded

by

have

(Rummel,

Iraq

in

of

a

decision.

the subjective uncertainties of success that
1976;

1980,

the

1979).
latter

decisive war

in its favor. In retrospect,

success

did

nor

capability
of

victory

accurately

and attitude.

success is

situation

it

Rummel

different from

(1976: 271). Rummel
may be certain,"

This prerequisite is

assess

For example, when Iran was
was "certain" of a quick and
Iraq was neither certain of
the new Iranian leadership's

believes that "subjective certainty"

"uncertainty" which

is inherent in the

(1976) argues that

while an "ultimate

neither the causes

of war nor the immediate

moves or responses of the opponent are predictable.
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Therefore,
intense the

at

this

stage

of

the

conflict, the larger and more

latent but conflict-laden attitude

becomes, the easier it

is for states to find an excuse (a triggering event), to manifest their
incompatible interests by initiating conflict.

Phase Three: The Balancing of Power and Interests.
In

this

phase,

vectors

of

power

get

adjusted

non-coercive.means.' The outcome of this process

by coercive or

is a balance of power

between participants whether they be states, spouses, or animal groups.
For

example,

trying

to

states,

balance

aggressively,

especially

their

sometimes

trade

the

industrial

deficits.

necessitating

powers, are always

This

radical

is

trade

often

pursued

measures which

could lead to deterioration in inter-state relations.
The balancing of power or
quo, manifestation

of power, and finally

force or accommodation.
States
ideologies,

have

interests involves testing of the status
conflict termination through

This process is detailed in figure 2.2.

their

idiosyncratic

socio-economic

norms

and

political

and/or

practices.

religious

Initially,

these

factors influence relationships between states, and their perception of
behaviour

toward one another.

This is also

While a teacher is lecturing in
some unattentive

true in human behaviour.

a classroom, he may be confronted with

students. The teacher has two

choices; either to put

an end to the disturbance or ignore it at the risk of having it spread.
The

students'

challenging

behaviour
what

is

they

credibility, and capability.
exercising

his

capability

a

clear

perceive
The

test
as

of

their

the

status

teacher's

quo

by

interests,

teacher can protect his interests by

hence

asserting his credibility. However,
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Figure 2.2

CONFLICT

PROCESS:

/// Balancing

of

The balancing

of power

phase

power

Coercive power-

-*-Force

IV Balance

-Status quo
testing

of

-*- Accomodation

Non coercive power-

-interest
-capability
-credibility

Source: Adapted from Rummel, 1976-

power

before

taking a

decision on

how best

to deal

with the problem, the

teacher, like the state, has to first gauge the behaviour of the actors
involved,

and

then

assess

the

costs

and benefits of his potential

response.
Preliminary testing
are compatible
indicates

of the status quo may

with the costs or

yield either that gains

that they are not.

that unacceptable risks

are involved. In

The latter case
other words, what

may be gained by disturbing a lecture may not be worth the cost of say,
being suspended from the course. After this stage, actors become either
accommodating or they reach

an agreement that essentially supports the

existing status quo (Rummel, 1976:
balancing of power

273). Therefore, we can say that a

may be achieved by only testing

the status quo and

then by reaching accommodations [see Figure 2.2].
As

mentioned,

however,

status

quo

testing may yield that gains

outweigh the costs or risks of the action taken. That might precipitate
an

actual confrontation;

a coercive

and/or a

non-coercive one . An

example of the latter occurred in 1984-1985 when the American microchip
industry was being adversely affected
chips.

In

by the flood of cheaper Japanese

response, the American government

threatened to erect high

tariff walls in the face of the invading Japanese products. Eventually,
they

negotiated

a

"mutually

agreeable"

quota

on US-bound computer

chips. The Japanese favored a limited access to American markets to the
possible

loss of

between the
Rummel

these markets

two countries.

(1976:

274), "will

and to

avoid creating trade tensions

Confrontations of
manifest

expertise, persuasion, rewards, and
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love,

this type, according to
altruism,

legitimacy,

promises." When these interests or

powers

are

manifested,

Rummel

adds,

"accommodations

will

be

confrontations

are

not

eternal

and ultimately lead to

by

the

victory

of

determined."
Coercive
accommodations

characterized

another.

Obviously,

such

further

as

coercive

torturing

powers
of

interest over

include threats or deprivations

political

socio-economic and political sanctions of
1976:

one

prisoners,

or

threats of

a state or a person (Rummel,

176-179 and 274).

Some

coercive

situations

necessitate

that

a choice between two

alternative negative interests must be made. If a person, say, was held
up by

an armed mugger asking

for his money and

threatening his life.

In this case, the choice is clear to most of us.
Coercive

confrontations are

interest, and capability.
you

may want to

willing is he

governed by

For example,

test the violent

depending on what is at stake,

capability of the

to use the weapon at hand?

the interest of the mugger to

the actors' credibility,

On

mugger; just how

the other hand, it is in

execute his threat because failing to do

so will tarnish his credibility on the street and among his sub-culture
"col leagues."
All coercive confrontations tend
Sociopolitical,
manifestations

including
of

family

physical

toward two types of conflict: (1)
and

force

diplomatic

such

as

disputes,

sending

and (2)

an army to war.

Sociopolitical conflicts include threats against the basic interests of
at

least one state

threats.
does not

hence forcing it

The credibility of

to respond, usually with counter

a threat-initiating state

defend its claim, or appear
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suffers if it

to have achieved certain desired

ends.

In a

look

situation of

for a negotiated

sociopolitical violence

settlement to their

or conflict, states

differences that will also

accommodate their interests (Rummel, 1976).
Sociopolitical violence may be
into the
use

insufficient to make one state give

will and interests of another.

of

physical

force

is

the

approach to decide upon states'

Rummel (1976) notes that the

ultimate

and usually the conclusive

conflicts of interests.

It is applied

only when one state takes on an unyielding position to the interests of
another

state. In this

case the proponents

contend that the victim country has
the coercing state.
until

one

state

its

have

the

(Rummel,
same

net

used, its use does not usually stop

capability

country then imposes new rules,
vanquished

in effect won a moral victory over

When force is
(or

1976).
result

of non-violent resistance

)

is defeated. The victorious

regulations, laws, and commands on the

Both
and

sociopolitical and physical forces
that

is a balance of powers between

actors.
Therefore, at
pursuit

this point of conflict evolution,

of change

situation and

are expected

to test

states who are in

the status quo, evaluate the

their options (both internally

and externally) and then

choose the "best" response to the challenge, be it coercive or not.
Phase Four: The Balance of Power.
In

this

behavioral

phase,
attitudes

a

developmental
of

states

takes

accommodations, understandings, and
The scope
highly

of this development which

dependent

on

the

process

triangle
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place.

which
As

influences
a

the

result norms,

practices to govern are developed.
influences state expectations, is
of

credibility,

capability, and

interests of states (Rummel, 1976: 279; Wright, 1951) [see Figure 2.1].
When

this triangle

established

and

equilibrium

is

coercive
the

reaches equilibrium,

a

new

structure

usually

reached

initial misconceptions of

each others potential.

Such

Israel withdrew

the

conflict

At this stage,

one another and

is then

is

This

resolved by

states have overcome

the miscalculations of

strategic policy errors were committed by

Israel in its 1982 invasion and
1985

of power

of expectations has evolved.
when

or non-coercive means.

a balance

all but

occupation of much of Lebanon. Then in
one thousand

of of

its soldiers. This

withdrawl was on the one hand, due to local and international pressure;
and on the other hand, due to the massive human and economic losses the
Israeli army
and revived

had suffered.

Instead, Israel

reconsidered its policies

the local militia ("South Lebanon

responsibility

for

the

"vacated"

region.

Army") so it can assume
In doing this, Israel had

reduced its financial and personnel commitment in south Lebanon, and at
the same time, it kept that area under occupation by proxy.
The

structure

of

expectations

adjustment of one's capability and
formed,

the structure of

is,

therefore,

by

interests to those of others.

expectations becomes a

gets altered, adjusted, or

formed

the
Once

dynamic system which

reinterpreted over time (Choucri and North,

1975).
The

non-conflict

sometimes
the

shaped by their

existing

interaction

interactions

balance
of

states

of
is

of

states

are

structure of expectations,
power.

Through

threatened

influenced

status quo, and

time,, however,

peaceful

by one country's assessment of

another; its behaviour, and rising domestic and foreign needs.
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and

The structure

of expectations has the

tendency to become inactive

or be disrupted (Rummel, 1976: 281). Expectations become inactive when
interaction between the involved actors
point

in

active

time

these

states

competition and

usually

results in

of

renew their relationships and contacts,

opposition will

a relationship

by-now established balance.
level

is halted. But if, at a future

complexity

This

be triggered.

that reaffirms

This, however,

or is based on the

seemingly simple process can enter a

depending

on

just

how

much

each

state's

capabilities and interests have changed.
One

can then

say that

this balance

of power

is a phase where a

reconstruction and/or reinterpretation of the structure of expectations
takes place.

This is only possible if

a regional (broad) equilibrium

of interests, capabilities, and credibilities is reached.

Phase Five: The Disruption Period.
Peace is
naturally
1951).

shaped (ie.

rising demands of
As mentioned in

involved states.

expectations
281)

extorted

not

But as

with

concessions
or unfair".

the quality
general

that

soon as

made

the

North, 1975; Wright,

the balance of power is

between

Although the

The main

accommodating; it does

interactions commence, states'
become altered.

evolution

of

actors

"may

capabilities

and

seem to have been

tendency to maintain the same

weakness of this
not account for
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new

Rummel (1976:

structure of expectations changes

of interactions, there is a

structure.

by the evolving and

interests, capabilities, and credibilities of

and subtle understandings

contends

interests,

states (Choucri and

the preceding phase,

equivalent to the mutual
the

threatened or enforced)

position is that it is

the changes in interests,

capabilities, and the actual

or potential challenge to the credibility

of the state. We can, therefore, say that in this case the structure of
expectations

and the

balance of

power lag

behind its

base (Rummel,

1976; 1977).
The structure of expectations can
period and
the

then be divided into a congruent

an incongruent one. The former

balancing

phase.

expectations, new and

While

attempting

period is one that reflects
to

rebalance

the

changing

accommodating expectations evolve. These changes

are called disruptors which can "upset the structure of expectations at
any time " (Rummel, 1976: 282), [see Figure 2.1].
An

incongruent

realities
period

of

there

distribution
the

period

interests,
is

is

strain and tension,

that

credibilities,

usually

because of

one

pressure

and

to

the changing

ignores

the

evolving

capabilities.

rebalance

new

In this

the existing power

expectations of states. Despite

nothing changes because

states, like people,

are more willing to accept known problems than to risk unknown ones.
What triggers the disruption period are explicit and "real" reasons
to

act, and

cause

not just

or reason

to act

simple frustration
crystalizes a

another eruption of open conflict.
ignores

evolving

wi11-to-conf1ict

realities
evolves as

or dissatisfaction.

A real

state's wi11-to-conf1ict hence

In an incongruent period and as one

(like

that

well. There,

of

rising

the "final

expectations), a
straw" is drawn

when a trigger transforms dissatisfaction into opposition. Triggers are
random events and their seriousness seem to correlate with the level of
the preceding tension.
In other words, the greater strain and tension are, the more likely
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the

status

quo

insignificance.

will

be

disrupted

For example, a

by

something

routine question by

of

apparent

a husband to his

wife, like "when will dinner be ready?" may unleash a violent "I am not
your slave." After that, the balance of power is re-established.
The five
of:

evolutionary phases of conflict

conflict

disruption.

uncertainty,

Two of these phases

during the
an

latency,

balancing,

Another

balance,

and

then

allow for conflict resolution. One is

balancing of power, that is

accommodation.

are a spiralling process

is during

to pre-empt conflict and reach
the disruption

period, that is

after conflict erupts.

2.4 Conflict Resolution
Because many variables influence
of its resolution is
once

domestic and/or

a conflict situation, the process

often extremely difficult.
peaceful options

for a

As mentioned earlier,
state run out, it looks

outwards for a solution. This may pertain to resource shortages, market
protection,

or

advantage.

Invariably, such

and

may

lead

the

to

resource-conflicts
political

maintenance

conflict
and

make his

(Coser,

(including military) future

party either

economic

1957).

military

Two factors characterize

their

resolution.

of some states

any activator

As a result

and

in orientation creates tension

certain strategic resources.

disadvantageous for
motives public.

one's

a change

complicate

their continuous supply of
usually

of

of a

First,

the

is dependent on
Second, it is

resource-conflict to

of both factors, the activating

disguises its "real" motives (or

goals) in the conflict,

or it may pursue and advance its interests by directing an unpublicized
war by proxy.
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One avenue of conflict resolution is accommodation which is usually
achieved

through negotiations.

parties

to a

conflict try

In the

to (1)

pre-negotiation preparations,

manipulate individuals,

groups or

governments to strengthen their negotiating position; (2) add or delete
certain issues from the agenda;
but

potential

1981).

participants

The last

and (3) include or exclude "undesired"

from

factor affects

the

negotiation process (Mitchell,

the relative

status of a country and

hence the potential outcomes of negotiations.
In

the

status is

pre-conflict
an acute one. A

negotiation

stages,

the

country's status might be

arsenal of deterrent weapons; on

issue of relative
determined by an

the battle field; in an international

forum like the United Nations; or by having a formidable economic base.
In this context, Mitchell (1981: 208) notes that

In many conflicts, the defined status of the parties, once
generally accepted, has an important effect upon the relative
position of advantage of the negotiators, on the way the
subject matter to be negotiated is defined, and on the
outcome of the discussions.
As

an illustration

(PLO)

mere

of this,

willingness

to

the Palestine
hold

talks

Liberation Organization's
with

Israel

implies

the

Organization's recognition

of Israel and its

sovereignty over all the

territories

holds,

the

it

currently

including

occupied ones.

The

implications of this for the PLO amount to a contradiction of the basic
tenet of the Organization; that is to establish a national homeland for
the Palestinians on the occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip. On the other
hand,

an Israeli recognition

willingness to
perceive

as

of the PLO

would amount to the former's

bargain the occupied territories—
the

biblically

promised
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land--

which many Israelis

in exchange for peace.

Bargaining

and

negotiations

are

accommodating conflict resolutions.

an

approach

that

could

lead

to

While capability and status affect

the bargaining position of a state, its bargaining range may be limited
by

controlling

conflicting
party.

the

agenda.

states, it is

"The

negotiation

basic

Although

this

usually a tool

process

on some relevant

option

is

open

to all

of the currently advantaged

involves

offering

issues, at the

the

benefits

of

cost of excluding others

from consideration" (Mitchell, 1981: 215).
Negotiation is a proven

approach to conflict resolution.

to assume that all conflict
compromise

can be solved by negotiation, mediation or

is simply dangerous

assume that

However,

what is his is

because it may

his, and what is

lead the "aggressor to
yours may be negotiable"

(Rummel, 1981: 247). Therefore, there may be times when aggression has
to be resisted to defend ones own territorial sovereignty as well as to
test the will, capability, and interest needs of the aggressor.
The mutual wills, interests, and capabilities of conflicting states
are

critical

process

factors

in

the

is conceptualized

process

within the

of conflict resolution.

This

following five approaches:

The

first approach asserts that once a conflict situation becomes clear and
well

defined,

conflict

intensity

could

be

reduced,

antagonists'

expectations be made more realistic, and the balancing process of power
be shortened.
hidden or
the

covert

(Rummel, 1981). A look beneath a conflict may reveal the

perhaps unconscious underlying goals
stimulators

of

hostilities;

or

of conflicting states;
unveil

the

hidden

or

undeclared causes of conflict hence its resolution is made easier.
A

second approach

to be

considered in
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conflict resolution is to

break down a large interest into smaller ones.

This approach, strongly

emphasised by Fisher (1971), will

make it easier to reach an agreement

on several smaller issues than on

a big one. Bargaining on some issues

is then made for concessions on others.
A

third

approach

overriding issue,

to

conflict

usually related to morality

antagonists can not ignore or dismiss.
common goal

of the actors.

(against

"common

a

resolution

An

enemy")

is

invoking

an

and principle, that the

That overriding issue becomes a

example of that is
unites

by

the

a foreign conflict

domestically conflicting or

opposing parties.
A
would

fourth approach
only

solution.

buy

the

is by

not relying

advantaged

Therefore, power

exclusively on

force as it

states

an expensive and a temporary

should only

be directed towards specific

goals or- interests and used in proportional terms.
A fifth and final approach

to conflict resolution is by creating a

distance in time and/or space hence some conflicts may fade away.

This

is possible only if the goals of the antagonists are not vital to their
survival or

damaging to their integrity.

space, demilitarized
forces

is

a

method

between antagonists
troops,

withdrawl of

Separating antagonists by a

and monitored by international —
of

terminating

conflict.

clearly requires the separation
claims, and/or

like the UN

Creating a distance
of actors —

correction of attitudes.

like
Rummel

(1981: 247) believes that such an approach will over time allow
the heat of battle to cool, rational perspectives on the
issue to develop, and the underlying interests to change; or
which
gives
each
party
an
opportunity
to satisfy
independently their conflicting interests.
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—

Rummel (1981), however, ignores
namely conflicts over dogmas
approach

does

lead

to

or principles.

conflict

resolve the underlying basis of
in Cyprus
Turkish

have for over a

the

Syrians

Rummel's (1981: 247) last

termination,

it

that conflict.

however, does not

For example, UN troops

decade been separating the

Cypriots. Similarly,

separates

the shortcomings of this approach,

a UN

from

buffer zone

the

Israelis.

Greeks from the

on the

Golan Heights

In spite of this, these

conflicts still fester.
Needless

to say,

the process

complex matter. This is due

organizations)

solutions to

in

a

conflicts.

many overt and covert elements (states

conflict.

Thus

Indeed some leading

war 1ike-Clausewitz, believe that
concept.

resolution is rather a

to the multiplicity of conflict causes and

effects, and the involvement of
and

of conflict

Rapoport, the editor

there rarely exist simple
scholars on conflict and

conflict resolution is a far fetched
of Clausewitz's classic

On War (1985:

424), notes that

Nothing in Clausewitz's analysis corresponds to 'debate',
since Clausewitz conceived conflict not as a search for truth
or justice but only as a struggle of wills. The idea of
conflict resolution is entirely foreign to his own way of
thinking.
In

spite

pessimism

of

of

the

complexities

Clausewitz's,

parties is to reach

the

of

conflict

ultimate

goal

resolution
for

the conflicting

a non-imposed self-supporting solution which deals

with al1 aspects of conflict, be it latent or covert.
to be long

and the

lasting, it must clear the way

hitherto arch-enemies.
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For the solution

for cooperation between the

2.5 Summary
States are future-oriented

political entities with changing needs,

interests, and capabilities. States
to exist and prosper.

must interact and compete in order

Conflicts between states remain latent until the

winds of political (eg. death of a leader), economic (eg. greater needs
and limited supplies), or social (eg.

a new ideology) change blow over

the landscape.
The seeds of conflict
rejected

due to the

developed

and

triggered

by an

Conflict

are sown when established accommodations are

sweeping processes of

opposing

attitudes

event, are

then enters a

used to

a decision on conflict,

is

Regardless

structure
triangle

of the

of expectations
of interests,

formed.

where the status quo is

accommodation, and/or non-conflict

chosen path,

and a

State capabilities,

manifest the opposing interests.

period of uncertainty

tested and
taken.

are

change. A new awareness is

balance of

capabilities, and

the net

outcome is a new

power:

A balance of the

credibilities, which

is in

essence a re-establishment of a status quo.
As

mentioned

straining

the

incongruent.

earlier,

triangle
Whether

states'

of

needs

expectations

are

always

changing thus

which

becomes increasingly

the change of expectations

is congruent or not,

disruption is inevitable. This throws the situation back into the stage
of uncertainty, where a new
new

status

quo

credibilities is
causes

and

that

structure of expectations is formed, and a

balances

established.

effects,

conflict

states'
In this web
resolution

interests, capabilities, and
of conflict evolution, its
may

either

eruption of conflict, or once it erupts to resolve it.
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pre-empt

the

Conflict
balancing

behaviour is
and

capabilities,

manifested by

rebalancing
and

of

the building and rebuilding,

territorial

credibilities.

Therefore,

space,
one

can

interests,
say that the

evolutionary process of conflict is a spiral of uncertainty, balancing,
balance, and disruption.
The

outcome

inter-related

of

a

factors:

manifestation;

the

factors

dependent

are

conflict
antagonists'

duration

the

antagonists.
to

sacrifices,
The

therefore,

goals

intensity

available

means

of

the

more

limited

solutions

are

by

some

conflict
All these

feasibility

of

Typically, the

the

aims

of

the

presumably find it easier

to the conflict.

peaceful

of

conflict.

resources,

potential loser will then

reach

and

shaped

of "acceptable" sacrifices.

negotiate a resolution

possible, to

and

on

objectives, and the extent
smaller

is,

In spite of

this, it is

acceptable to the antagonists

without having a victor and a vanquished.
This

chapter discusses

development, evolution,
resources
process

and how

resource

and

has shown

as

community.

less

might

The

or people

that advantaged
are

it

issue of

The motif

lead states

politically)

scarcities

international

and resolution.

it could

of conflict

militarily,

theoretically the

first

of

is competition for
to conflict.

of

conditions

their

scarcity in Lebanon and in

attempts

to analyse

if and

how the

useful in explaining the Litani

rank

in

of
the

the subsequent two chapters

discusses the causes, effects, costs, and the geopolitical
of water

The

states (economically,

tolerant

endanger

conflict, its

Israel.

implications

The other chapter (five)

theory of

conflict is or is not

river dispute, and the "security belt"
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in south Lebanon.

The point of

water in the Middle East is

the exercise is to show if scarcity of

a contributing factor to the current state

of hostility between Lebanon and Israel.
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C H A P T E R

T H R E E

An Historical Background to
The Litani River Dispute

This chapter traces Zionist

historical efforts to either annex the

Litani river's lower flow path (Upper Galilee region) to the mandate of
Palestine,

or

Integral to this

to

divert

the

river

into

the

Jordan river system.

are details of the historical events

that led to the

current boundary line between

Israel and Lebanon, essentially starting

in 1916

The rest of the

and ending in 1948.

chapter is then divided

into two major time periods: 1948 to 1966 and 1967 to 1978.
focuses on

the developments between Israel and

the Jordan river dispute between
focuses

on the relationship

Lebanon, as well as on

Israel, Syria and Jordan.

between the Jordan

The former

The latter

water dispute and the

1967 Arab-Israeli (Six Day) War. Also discussed is the Israeli creation
of the the so-called "security belt" in the water-rich area of southern
Lebanon.

A concluding

discussion draws
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the various

points together

arguing that

the scarcity of water in

to the 1967 Arab-Israeli War,
and

its continuous

Israel is a contributing factor

to Israel's invasion of Lebanon in 1978,

presence in

south Lebanon's

"security belt" ever

since then.

3.1 The Earlv Historical Period: 1905-1948.
It is

important to begin by clarifying

the word "Zionism."

It is

derived from "Zion" 'which is the name given to what the Jews believe is
their

biblically "promised land"

or "Eretz Israel"

(i.e. the Land of

Israel; Kimmerling, 1983: 1-8). Theodor Herzel, an Austrian writer and
journalist,

is

regarded

religiously

based

as

political

Herzel was a victim of

Hence, his idea

but

a mere response

then see why
—

as

a

father

phenomena

and
known

as

of the modern

Zionism.

Although

the 20th. century), he remained a secular

of a Jewish

state was not religiously motivated

to Western anti-semitism

Herzel did not at first covet

Jewish

founder

rampant anti-semitic sentiments in Europe (just

before and after the dawn of
Jew.

the

homeland.

The

(Dossa, 1986).

Palestine —

Zionists

One can

The Holy Land

later (at the turn of the

twentieth century) chose to reconstruct a Jewish home in Palestine.
essence,

then, Zionism

"Jewish Homeland".
land,

Besides their

the Zionists' choice

geopolitics,

and by a

(Kimmerling, 1983:
was

attempts to

gather world

Jewry in a national

"spiritual claims" over the promised

of Palestine was

influenced by economics,

misconception about the

1-8). The early Zionists

sparsely inhabited, if

In

at all. Hence,

demography of the area
believed that Palestine

their motto: "Land without

people for the people without land" encapsualtes this view.
Since about 1917, the

Zionist movement has geographically included
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the Litani basin in its

definition of "Eretz Israel" (Stauffer, 1985).

Diverting the Litani river of Lebanon

into the Jordan to meet the long

term

irrigation and

power needs

of Palestine

1905

by an engineer

called N. Wilbush

was first suggested in

(Brawer, 1968: 234). Aware of

the scarcity and economic value of water, the Zionist leaders of Europe
actively lobbied

the French and the British

northern and northeastern borders of

governments to adjust the

Palestine so that it includes the

i

whole
river.

catchment of
Therefore,

Palestine", a

the Jordan
the

river and

Litani

river

a large

and

water-rich area, were in the

creation of the Jewish State.

part of the Litani

the "Northern Frontier of
lime-light well before the

The process of drawing the boundary line

between Lebanon and Palestine started in 1916 and continued until 1923.
At that

time, the Zionists were trying

to convince the Mandate powers

to adjust Palestine's northern frontier.
The

Sykes-Picot

Agreement

of

1916

was

the

first

attempt

to

partition the Ottaman Empire's territories between the European powers.
They agreed

to divide the "Arab Levant"

(today's Syria, Jordan, Iraq,

Israel, and Lebanon) into three spheres of influence:
or

rather a small

enclave encompassing the

A British sphere

two coastal towns of Acre

and Haifa, A French sphere with its southern boundaries delimited, more
or less, just south of
Israel

and Lebanon; And

French

one and

sphere

was to

negotiations
controlled

the current international boundary line between
an international sphere

surrounding the
be governed

by an

British "enclave."

Syria of

The international

Allied Condominium.

and many territorial
Lebanon and

located south of the

After years of

proposals and "compromises", France
today, and
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Britain controlled Iraq,

Palestine

and

Transjordan

Jordan river).

(ie.

territory

on both sides of the

According to Frederic Hof (1985:

7 ) , "The British had

succeeded in getting Palestine

the

for themselves through a combination of

military superiority and Zionist Political support ... ."
Shortly

after the Sykes-Picot

(ZO), led by Lord
of 1917.

Agreement, the Zionist Organization

Rothschild, extracted the famous Balfour Declaration

On the behalf of his

Arthur James Balfour sent a

government, Britain's Foreign Secretary

written pledge to Lord Rothschild in which

he stated Britain's willingness

to assist the Zionists in establishing

a

Palestine.

Jewish

"national

home"

in

natural for the ZO to support
Once that was secured, the
the

northern boundaries

wishes. - As

alluded

Britain in its bid to control Palestine.

ZO lobbyed the British government to define
of Palestine

to

earlier,

according to the Organization's

the

region, of

paramount importance to the

Zionists,

the

British

Consequently, it was only

were

Upper Galilee is a water-rich
Zionists.

indifferent

to

However, unlike the
Palestine's

northern

boundaries and the river that it may have or not included (Hof, 1985).
The

peak of

the world

ZO's efforts

in seeking "broader economic

frontiers" for Palestine was during the Paris Peace Conference in 1919.
The ZO was then headed by the prominent Jewish Scientist Chaim Weizmann
who

had earlier

secured Britain's

homeland in Palestine.

sympathy to

the idea

of a Jewish

As the

conference was entering its final stage

of negotiations on the fate of

Palestine, the ZO sought the support of

of the British Prime Minister, David
Prime

Minister, the

ZO stated

river's flow area, especially in

Lloyd George. . In a letter to the

that due

to topography

of the Litani

its southern parts, the river's water
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is

"valueless to the

can

only

be

used

(Weisgal, 1977:
that

territory north of
beneficially

was

frontiers

supplementing

its

or

either
for

flow

for

that

suggest that best use of

direct

diversion

so

They

the country much further south."

267) The letter continued to

river's, water

proposed

in

the proposed frontier.

irrigation south of the

into

the

irrigation

Jordan

river

thus

and hydroelectric power

generation downstream could be fostered (Weisgal, 1977: 266-267).
Based

on

"essential"
about 25
slopes

the

reasons

mentioned

for "the (Bekaa)

Valley of the

miles above the bend,"
of Mount

Palestine so

Hermon all

be included

ZO

considered

it

Litani, for a distance of
"Western and Southern

in the

that control of the headwaters

and to stretch

the

as well as the

(Weisgal, 1977: 267). The eastern
river

above,

Northern frontier of

of the Jordan is ensured"

frontier was to include the Yarmouk

southwards parallel to,

but few kilometers west

of, the Hejaz railway line (Weisgal, 1977).
The
June

Zionist proposal

1920,

proposed

internationally

was, however,

a

boundary

recognized

Naqurah

and

proceeded

include

the

Jewish

line

one.

It

eastward

settlement

that

then

France which, in

eventually

started

to
of

rejected by

turn

Metulla.

just

became

the

south of Ra's an

sharply northward to
This proposal left the

entire Litani river within French held territory.
Clearly angered by the
to

modify it

October
wrote

so that

1920, and
the

the Litani

in the

following

latest French proposal, the Zionists sought
could be

name of

letter

to

salvaged.

On the 30th of

the Zionist movement, Dr. Weizmann
Lord

Britain's Foreign Secretary:
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Curzon, Balfour's successor as

Your Lordship, I am sure, realises the enormous importance of
the Litany to Palestine. Even if the whole of the Jordan and
the Yarmouk are included in Palestine, it has insufficient
water for its needs.
The summer in Palestine is extremely
dry, and evaporation rapid and intense. The irrigation of
Upper Galilee and the power necessary for even a limited
industrial life must come from the Litany.
Experts agree
that the Litany is of little use to the well-watered Lebanon
and we have always agreed that the requirements of the
territory not included in Palestine should be adequately met.
It is hardly possible that France even realises the extent to
which the frontier she has proposed would cripple the
economic life of Palestine. For if Palestine were cut off
from the Litany, Upper Jordan and Yarmouk, to say nothing of
the western
shore of the Galilee,
she could not be
economically
independent. And a
poor and impoverished
Palestine would be of no advantage to any Power (as quoted
by: Hof, 1985: 11-13).
Although

Weizmann

was

successful

redemarcate the Northern Frontiers
the

French. The Franco-British

boundary

line proposed

subject of
was

no

later
line

of

French in

between Lebanon and

principle to the

June of 1920.

Although the

The British-Franco Convention

boundary commission to
the emerging state

demarcate the exact

of Israel.

14), "the final boundary agreement,"

the British and

the British to

discussed at the Convention, there

Litani river.

established a joint

Hof (1985:

Convention agreed in

by the

the

convincing

of Palestine, he failed to convince

water in the region was

mention

in

the French and came into effect

According to

which was ratified by
on the 10 March 1923,

"made no further mention of Zionist access to French-controlled water".
After
beginning
Litani.
needs

to

British-Franco
lose

hope

In 1936 Zionist
for

University
could

the

be

electric

generated

of

ever

having

The

study,

suggested that
to

of

1923.

serve

the
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by a study on regional

conducted

electric power
the

the Zionists were

even limited access to the

hopes were rekindled

power.

of Beirut,

agreement

region

for

the American

from the Litani

of south Lebanon and

"possibly Safad in Palestine" (Hof, 1985: 30).
In

addition to

that, in

1943 a

joint study

southern Lebanon and northern Palestine
a Lebanese engineering firm.

only one-seventh

was undertaken by a Jewish and

This study assumed that Lebanon would use

the Litani for irrigation purposes
since

on the hydrology of

of the

only. The study then concluded that

Litani could

be usefully

employed by

Lebanon, most of the water

should be diverted into Palestine (Schmidt,

1955;

these

Hof,

1985).

proposals

and

realization

counter

of

Palestine.

All

the

hydrological

proposals

Zionist

dream

were
of

studies

solely
a

and

aimed

"national

frontier

toward

the

Jewish home" in

That dream became a reality in May of 1948.

3.2 The Period of 1948 - 1966
Upon

the

creation

Arab-Israeli
suspicion

war

of

the

erupted.

in the

State

This

of

raised

area, essentially

Israel
the

in 1948, the first

levels

foiling any

of

tension and

possible cooperation

between Israel and Lebanon.
During
adjoining

that

Zionist

the western bend

1949 General
latter

war,

forces

occupied

of the Litani

river.

Armistic Agreement (GAA) between

country's

troops

withdrew

to

an

area

As a

in Lebanon

result of the

Lebanon and Israel, the

the internationally demarcated

boundaries of 1923.
According to
1948

because

Thereafter,
survey)

Berger (1965), Israel withdrew

it
a

would

believed

joint
be

that

a

exploitation

possible.

territorial annexation of

from South Lebanon in

formal peace treaty was possible.
of

the

Furthermore,

Litani (based on the 1943
the Israelis believed that

Lebanese territory might spark international
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condemnation (Hof,

1985).

Berger (1965, 30) then

(the Israelis) had felt that...
negotiations

as the

notes that "if they

the Lebanese did not also consider the

penultimate step

towards peace

they would never

have withdrawn."
Due to its delicate

confessional political system and the currents

of Arab nationalism that were emerging in the region, Lebanon could not
even consider a water-sharing agreement or a separate peace treaty with
Israel. Any such consideration would have constituted a break-away from
the

Arab

economic

sphere.
costs

This
that

in

Lebanon

Furthermore,

"if Lebanon did

eyes

Shi'a farmers

of the

water,

there would

turn

would have had heavy political and

was

not

willing

sell water out
in the

able

to

pay.

of the country, past the

South who

be considerable

or

do not

have irrigation

local discontent"

(Hudson, 1971:

13).
The
sharing
any large

developments

of

1948-1949

agreement between Israel

foiled

possibilities

and Lebanon which

irrigation schemes from taking place

"With or without Lebanese water,

of a water

in turn prevented

in the Negev. However,

Israel was determined to make patches

of the desert bloom" (Hof, 1985: 31).
In order to accomplish

this objective, Israel planned an extensive

canal system to divert part of Jordan's water to the desert-like region
in the south.
'National

As construction on the Canal [which was later called the

Water

Carrier']

commenced

in

September

of

1953,

Syria

expressed its strong objection to the project. Syria's stand, which was
supported by

the United States, forced Israel

October of 1953. In the

to halt construction in

same month the American President, Eisenhower,
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sent his personal representative, Mr. Eric Johnston, to the Middle East
hoping
into

to transform
a "show case"

the potentially

explosive controversy over water

of cooperation between

the Arabs and Israel (Hof,

1985).
Negotiations

over the

were facilitated

allocation of

by the American envoy from

Plan", Johnston's

Main Plan.

tabled in 1953,

"on the grounds that it is a Lebanese

that could not be included

(Schmidt, 1955:

in the region

1953 till 1955. The "Main

initial water cooperation proposal,

did not mention the Litani river
national river

surface water

in an international scheme"

5 ) . However, the Arab states

The Israeli reason was the

and Israel rejected the

Plan's exclusion of the Litani

river.
Israel responded to the Main

Plan by asking the American engineer,

Joseph Cotton to study the situation.
which

were a

position

mere elaboration

(Naff and Matson,

river was the Jordan, Cotton
sharing of

Cotton put forward his proposals

of Israel's

earlier water negotiating

1984; Rizk, 1964).

Although the disputed

suggested, among other things, a peaceful

the Litani waters for the

purposes of power generation and

irrigation in Israel.
The

Cotton Plan

Litani river's

estimated that

Lebanon needed

water for irrigation. This Plan,

only 50

% of the

like the 1943 report,

assumed that Lebanon would harness the Litani's hydroelectric potential
only in

cooperation with Israel.

the Litani's annual flow of
into the

Cotton recommended

that one half of

850 million cubic meters (MCM) be diverted

Jordan river. In return,

Lebanon would receive hydroelectric

power from Israel (Schmidt, 1955; Rizk, 1964).
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The
Litani
cubic

"Cotton Plan"

was based

and the Jordan

on the

rivers which he

meters (MCM).

Cotton then

combined annual

flow of the

estimated to be 2345.7 million

recommended that

that water volume

should be shared in the following way:
1) Israel
2) Lebanon
3) Syria

1290.0 MCM.
450.7 MCM.
30.0 MCM.

4) Jordan

575.0 MCM.

TOTAL ...

2345.7 MCM.

Source: Naff and Matson, 1984.
After
"Johnston
river

and

much

negotiation,

Plan" was
gave

the

reached.

Lebanon

"Main

This

the

Plan"

Plan did

right

to

was

amended

not include

and the

the Litani

utilize 35 MCM of the Jordan

headwaters at the Hasbani tributary.
Water Distribution According to
The Johnston Plan
Lebanon
35 MCM
Israel
400 MCM
Syria
132 MCM
Jordan
720 MCM
TOTAL
1257 MCM
Source: Naff and Matson, 1984.
This

Plan

countries.

was

accepted

by

It was, however,

representatives

of

Israel and the Arab

not "officially" accepted by the involved

parties because that would have amounted to Arab recognition of Israel,
and of Israel's renunciation of its historic claim over the Litani.
spite

of this, the

Plan was more

or less adhered

In

to by the riparian

states, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria.
Israel's hope to share the Litani never materialized.
Lebanon's

negotiating position

was strengthened
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by the

Furthermore,
release of a

report

in 1954

by the

U.S. Bureau

stated

that Lebanon could

of Land

Reclamation.

usefully employ almost

water for both its irrigation

The report

all of the Litani's

and electric power needs (Schmidt, 1955:

10).
The loud Zionist and later Israeli claims for the Litani river, and
their

charges that

water

is

the river

flowing

is "useless"

"wastefully"

into

the

for Lebanon, and that its
sea

prompted the Lebanese

government to eliminate the pretext under which Israel could invade and
occupy southern Lebanon. Such an
of

harnessing the

river.

Hence in

Israeli move would be for the purpose

irrigation and
1955 the

and power

potentials of the Litani

Lebanese government

took it upon itself to

approve a large development plan called the "Litani Project".
Initially, the Project was aimed at generating hydroelectric power.
This
the

objective was later
southern

objective

Bekaa

is yet

modified to satisfy

Valley

to be

and

south

implemented.

partly due to Israel's threat

the irrigation needs of

Lebanon.
The

lack of

However, the latter
implementation is

"to use force against Lebanon to prevent

the utilization of the Litani waters to develop South Lebanon" (Rokach,
1986: xiv).
Despite the initial political outcry by Syria over Israel's plan to
divert part of the Jordan river southwards, Israel resumed construction
on its

"National Water Carrier" which was

states

formulated

a

unified

response

completed in 1964. The Arab
to

Israel's aggressive water

policy. During an Arab Summit Conference in Cairo 1964, the Arab states
decided to foil Israel's diversion plan by diverting the Jordan river's
tributaries

(the Hasbani

and the

Banias rivers)
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for the purposes of

irrigation in Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon (Smith, 1966).
The rugged terrain would have
into

the Yarmouk a

rendered the diversion of the Banias

difficult technical task.

However, diverting the

Hasbani into the Litani would have been easier as both river's are only
5 km

apart.

the

flow

of

Had the diversion been
the

Jordan

successful, it would have reduced

river substantially thus thwarting Israel's

water policy to irrigate the Negev.
Lebanon reluctantly accepted the Summit's controversial resolution.
Not wanting

to be politically and economically

world, Lebanon began implementing its
the

early

summer

of

1965.

part of the diversion project in

According

notified the Lebanese government that
diversion

scheme,

(Bar-Yaacov,
working on
was

1967:

even

if

Israel

148).

In

isolated from the Arab

to

Bar-Yaacov, the Israelis

they were determined to stop the
had

July

to

of

use

1965

its intermittent

military force

Lebanon chose to cease

the diversion project. Israel's intent

underscored by

its

attacks on

to stop the project
the Syrian diversion

site at Banias (Hof, 1985).
3.3 The Period of 1967 - 1978
A

number of

observers believe

the tensions

water dispute were a major contributing
which put a sudden and a

that arose

from the

factor to the 1967 Six Day War

final end to Arab river diversion plans (Hof,

1985; Stauffer, 1982).
The 1967
of whom
only

war involved three of Israel's

lost territory as a

notable

unchanged.

exception.

four Arab neighbours, all

result of the conflict.
Its

In the aftermath

frontier
of the 1967
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remained

Lebanon was the
quiet

and

hence

war it was quickly observed

that the Hasbani river of Lebanon
river that was not in

was the only tributary to the Jordan

Israeli controlled territory.

This prompted the

victorious Defence Minister of Israel, Moshe Dayan, to declare that his
country

had

achieved

"provisionally

satisfying

frontiers, with the

exception of those with Lebanon" (Cooley, 1978: 3 ) .
Dayan's
General

was

followed

Armistic Agreement with

Minister
Israel

statement

Levi Eshkol
cannot sit

Israel's renunciation of the

Lebanon.

was quoted

idle while

by

Furthermore, Israel's Prime

as saying

the Litani

that the thirsty state of
flows "wastefully" into the

Mediterranean (le-Monde. 8 September, 1967).
led the Lebanese to conclude

All of these declarations

that Israel intended to invade and occupy

parts of south Lebanon to at least incorporate the remaining headwaters
of the Jordan

river (Jureidini and Hazen, 1976), and

at most to annex

the southern flow area of the Litani.
In

the spring

of 1964,

Israeli officials

debated the

"size" of

their young state and responsibility for "losing" the Litani. While Ben
Gurion

expressed his

regrets for

losing the

Litani, Israel's Labour

Minister, Yigal Allon, charged angrily that one more day of fighting in
the

1948

War

would

have

enabled

the Israeli Army to "liberate the

entire country" from the Litani river

in the north to the Sinai desert

in the south-west (Times {London], 9 March, 1964: 8 ) .
The water disputes of the 1950s are believed to have contributed to
the

1967 War (Hof,

debate

in

country",
pretext

Israeli
and

1985; Stauffer, 1982
political

Israel's

to occupy

circles

ability

South Lebanon

to

and 1985).
about

have

in June
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In

spite of the

the size of the "entire

successfully

fabricated a

of 1967 (Hof, 1985), Israel

opted not to delimit the Litani as its northern boundary.
Israel's restrained behaviour towards
following

factors:

first,

substantially. Israel's
Second,

Israel's

tributary
and

the

fresh

occupation

newly
water

of

served Lebanon a

occupied territories augmented
supply

the

originates) rendered the

Lebanon is due mostly to the

by

up to forty percent.

Golan Heights (where the Banias

Hasbani diversion plan impossible,

stern warning-by-example. Third,

Hof (1985: 38)

»

contends

that

"An

Israeli

seizure

provoked

international outrage and

of

southern

Lebanon could have

condemnation without significantly

enhancing Israel's economic prospects".
The

relative passivity

of Israel's

policy toward

Lebanon took a

downturn in 1969. The proximate reason for Israel's violent retribution
against the southern Lebanese
Israel. However,
prolonged
the

was the Palestinian "threat" to northern

it is "reasonable to suggest",

Zionist frustration over

violent tenor of

Hof writes, "that the

the issue of

water contributed to

subsequent Israeli actions

in southern Lebanon"

ever since the late sixties (Hof, 1985: 3 9 ) .
One year after the civil war erupted in Lebanon, Israel initiated a
more

active policy

government decided

toward south

20

On

upon a "new comprehensive

northern settlements.
Lebanon as the

Lebanon.

This policy

3 ) . This

security" policy for its

viewed the pacification of southern

key to peace and security in

July, 1976:

July 1976, the Israeli

new policy

the area (New York Times,

approach, called "the good fence

program", stressed humanitarian relief to villagers who were finding it
increasingly
policy

was

difficult
the

to

creation

travel
of

a

northwards.
pro-Israeli
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Another aspect of the
militia to help prevent

Palestinian guerillas

from reaching Israel's border.

policy"

first open Israeli

was also the

The "good fence

involvement in the economic,

social, and political affairs of Lebanon.
Then,

in. 1978,

"security

zone".

extending along
belt is narrow

It

Israel
is

a

invaded
strip

South

Lebanon and established a

six to fifteen kilometers in width

Israel's entire northern frontier
in the west and widens as it

with Lebanon.

This

moves toward the east and

<

north east until
Figure

it reaches the western bend of

4.1]. This

self-declared belt

the Litani river [see

was turned

over to Major Saad

Lebanese Army Major.

He established and

Haddad,

a renegade Christian

led the

South Lebanese Army (SLA).

led by Haddad's successor, Anton
thousand men today, is trained,

Both the belt and

the SLA are now

Lahd. The SLA which numbers about two
equipped, and paid by Israel. Hence it

acts as Israel's proxy power in southern Lebanon.
In retrospect, Israel's policy
been cemented in the mid-1950s.
discussing
Israeli

the

Prime

most

towards South Lebanon seems to have

At this time, Israeli politicians were

appropriate

Minister,

Moshe

policy

toward

Lebanon. The former

Sharett,

quoted

in

his

diary

country's Chief of Staff, Moshe Dayan as saying:
the only thing that's necessary is to find an officer, even
just a Major. We should either win his heart or buy him with
money, to make him agree declare himself the savior of the
Maronite population. Then
the Israeli army will enter
Lebanon, will occupy the necessary territory, and will create
a Christian regime that will ally itself with Israel. The
territory from the Litani southward will be totally annexed
to Israel and everything will be all right (as quoted by
Rokach, 1986: 26).
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the

Therefore, with
has,

and for

the Christian-headed security belt,
the first

time since

1948, secured

Israel once again
an access to a new

water resource, the Litani river.
Israel's biggest ever invasion of

Lebanon occurred in June 1982. A

few months later, the Minister of Science and Technology, Yuval Neeman,
conceded that "Israeli engineers
tests
"the

near the Litani' s
ideal place for

about three

had carried out seismic soundings and

westward bend", an

a diversion tunnel

miles long to reach Israel's

area which is

said to be

which would only

need to be

Huleh water system" (Cooley,

1983: 11).
It must be noted that the "security belt" is viewed by some as just
that:

a mere

buffer zone

both

Lebanese and

claim

at best as

context of

Palestinians— in
it does not

and the "hostile" forces

south Lebanon.

consider or account

the Lebanese Israeli conflict.

Israel's firm hegemony
and about
are

between Israel

What

hardly

operation and

confined

This is a shaky
for the historical

can not be ignored is

over the "belt", a task carried

one thousand Israeli army "advisors".
to

the

"security

belt"

influence tends to expand and

—

out by the SLA

Both of these parties
zone.

Their

area of

contract depending on the

situation.
These facts not only confirm Lebanon's worst fear (of Israel's need
for

the

Litani

conclusions:

water)

but

have

led

to

the

following

tangible

Since 1978 it has been reported that both Saad Haddad and

his successor, Anton

Lahd, had put an end to
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all new well digging and

in

some

instances

Matson, 1984).
river

by the

they

ordered

existing

wells

to close (Naff and

Furthermore, Lebanon's allocated share
Johnston Plan

now flows

into Israel

of the Hasbani

(Naff and Matson,

1984).

3.4 Summary
From this chapter

it is clear that Israel has

interest in the Litani river
attempted
creation

various
of the

of Lebanon.

approaches,

most

"security belt."

had a long standing

Towards this end, Israel has

recent
This belt

of

which

has

been her

has already resulted in

some tangible water returns for Israel. But what is the long-term value
(ie.

cost

and

benefit)

of

this.- water-rich "belt" to Israel?

Does

Israel really need to import water? If so, why from Lebanon? Is water a
transferrable resource?

These questions and others

current state of water supply and

pertaining to the

demand in both Israel and in Lebanon

will be addressed in the following chapter.
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C H A P T E R

FOUR

The Hydro-politics
of
South

Lebanon

This chapter sets to establish
and the
First,
emphasis

socio- political implications of
the

geography

of

Lebanon

on the hydrology

problem

follows.

demand,

the

Domestic and
are then

a case of water scarcity in Israel,

This

quality,

and

this incipient water crisis.
Israel

of both countries
is

achieved

quantity,

and

using

An analysis of the water
data on water supply and

sources of the available water.

foreign water-augmenting options being

discussed and evaluated. This leads

socio-economic and
and Israel.

is discussed, with an

pursued by Israel

to the discussion of the

political values attached to

water in both Lebanon

The chapter concludes that the "lure of the Litani" is too

great to be overlooked by Israeli geostrategists and water planners.
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4.1 The Geographical Setting
4.1.1 Israel
Both Lebanon and Israel are similar in that they both have climatic
regions ranging from wet to arid, and both have typically Mediterranean
climates—

hot and dry

summers, and mild

rainy winters. However, the

Israeli case is more extreme. Over 50% of the country is covered by the
southern Negev

desert.

Precipitation ranges from 1000

Safad (north), 500 'mm in Tel Aviv (coast), 200
central), and only
Negev

about 30 mm in Eilat, the

desert (Pohoryles,

decrease in

1975: 1).

mm in Beersheba (south

most southern tip of the

There is,

rainfall from north to south.

mm per year in

therefore, a dramatic

A similar but less dramatic

decrease occurs from west to east.
The raised areas of the country have a north-south orientation with
a

tendency to

Lebanon's

drop in

mountain

precipitation

is

elevation as

ranges

become

influenced

by

they stretch
hills

the

in

southwards.

Israel.

landscape

Hence

Accordingly,

relief;

whereby the

western slopes receive more rain than do the areas in the "rain shadow"
or on
also

the leeside of the
a factor

ascent, the

hills.

that affects

Moreover, the angle

the precipitation

smaller the area where

of the slope is

level. The steeper the

the amount of rain

yielded by the

cooling of the air concentrates.
Israel's
(about

1900

headwaters of
the occupied
annual

only

major

million

river

cubic

with

meters,

the Jordan river are in

an
MCM)

almost constant annual flow
is

in Arab

main beneficieries of the river.

Jordan river. The

Lebanon, Jordan, Israel, and in

Golan Heights of Syria. Although

flow originates

the

over 70% of the river's

countries, Jordan

and Israel are the

There are other perennial streams in
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Israel

such as:

the Yarkon

which empties

which empties between Tel Aviv and Haifa.
reduced to a trickle in the

transports and

coast

and the

such as the

into the huge National Water Carrier

distributes water

agricultural land

utilization of

The flow of these streams is

dry summer season. In spite of this, these

streams and others are integrated
which

near Tel Aviv, and Hadera

to the

in the

urban centers

on the

south and east. The complete

the water resources in Israel

renders some river beds,

Yarkon, as "reservoirs" of sewage or

as sea water marshes

(Orni and Efrat, 1966: 44).
Lake Tiberias, also known as sea of Galilee or as lake Kinneret, is
Israel's

main reservoir of

fresh water with

3000 MCM. The lake, deepest in
issuing

point of

its north east (49 meters), is also the

the National

Tiberias . is

165

square

beneath

the

Mediterranean

smaller

streams empty

an estimated capacity of

Water Carrier

kilometers
Sea

into lake

(km)

level.

[see Figure 4.1].

in

The

Lake

area and is 213 meters
Jordan

Tiberias. Despite

river and other
this, the lake is

relatively saline. Its Chloride content ranges from 250 milligrams (mg)
per 1 iter to 400 mg/1.

4.1.2 Lebanon
In Lebanon, two mountain chains run parallel to the coast, with the
Bekaa Valley in between.
the

north,

and

Precipitation
800 on
northern

they

These mountains are as high as 3090 meters in
drop

in these mountains

the coast and in
Bekaa.

Mediterranean;

in

The
short

elevation

as they stretch southward.

ranges from 900

the southern Bekaa, and
climatic

rainy

conditions

winters,
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and

in
long

to 2000 mm/yr; over
less than 300 in the
Lebanon are typically
dry summers.

Such a

Figure 4.1

The Basin of the Jordan and Litani Rivers

10 miles

fiiliggj

Security Belt
Official Zionist Boundary Proposal,1919

Sources: HOF, 1985; Drysdale & Blake, 1 9 8 5 ;
The Economist. Sept. 2 7 , 1 9 8 6 .
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climate

clearly

affects

the

flow

of

rivers, many of which tend to

either dry up or to have a greatly reduced flow in the summer.
The

Litani river springs

from a point

10 km west

of the city of

Baalbeck at an elevation of 1000 meters above sea level. From there the
river flows southwards through the
of

130 km before

reaches
basin

it turns west

the Mediterranean
of the

and flows for

sea, a

Litani river

within Lebanon.

fertile Bekaa Valley for a distance
another 40 km until it

short distance

(2170 km

north of Tyre.

The

squared in area) lies completely

The flow of the river at the Karoun dam (which has the

capacity to conserve 200 MCM) averages 410 MCM/yr; a flow that may vary
from year to

another by 300 MCM/yr.

western bend of the Litani [Figure

Near the

town of Khardali at the

4.1], the average flow of the river

is 650 MCM/yr, with a variation of 400 MCM/yr over a number years.
Unlike

the

Litani,

the

Hasbani

Lebanon and flows southwards to
[Figure 4.1].
flow in

springs

from south east

become a tributary to the Jordan river

The Hasbani's average

both the Litani and

river

flow is 157 MCM/yr.

the Hasbani rivers is

Although the

continuous, it has

the tendency to fluctuate from month to month, and from year to year.
The

high

rate

negative impacts
supply and
the

of

water

on water quality, as

increasing demand.

country's

consumption

historical

in Israel, has largely had

well as simultaneously limiting

The current water

interest

jitters in Lebanon since 1978.
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in

the

crisis in Israel and

Litani water has created

4.2 Israel's High Water Consumption: An Analysis
There is
in

Israel

a general consensus among
that

the

replenishable .water
supply has
factors
broad

country
stock.

is

hydologists and water managers

currently

In fact, the gap

been widening. It is, therefore,

that led to

this situation.

frameworks, one

developing

of which

This

all

of

its

between water demand and
imperative to analyse the
is accomplished within two

is demographic

and cultural, and the

other is ideological and agricultural.

4.2.1 Demography and Culture.
Prior to the establishment
the theme

of "a people (the

Jews) without a land

(Palestine) without a people"
discovered
they

of Israel in 1948, Zionists popularized
returning to a land

(Kimmerling, 1983: 9 ) . The Zionists soon

that Palestine was

not only inhabited

had anticipated (Kimmerling,

by more people than

1983: 9 ) , but

much of the land was

Israel, thousands of

Jews from around the

under (largely dry) cultivation.
After
world

the inception of

responded to Zionist

calls and returned

[see table 4.1 and 4.2].
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to "the Promised Land"

Table 4.1
Sources of Population Increase
in Thousands
Period

Pop. at
beginning
of period

Pop. at
end of
period

Total
increase

2150.40
1344.8
3120.70
901.8
948.1
4063.40
4199.70
166.0

1948-60
805.60
1961-71
2150.40
1972-82
3115.60
1983-84
4033.70

Yearly
% of
increase

7.6
3.4
2.4
1.3

% of
migration
balance
of total
increase

64.6
37.7
19.3
14.9

Source: Israel, Central Bureau of Statistics, No.36, 1985:
33.

Table 4.2
Jewish Immigration By Continent Of Origin
in percent

Time Period

Europe

America

Africa

Asia

1919-1931
1932-1938
1948-1951
1952-1959
1975-1981

81.2
86.8
47.6
32.1
60.1

2.5
2.3
0.7
3.4

0.7
0.6

8.9
8.3

13.7
51.96

34.6
12.4
10.3

5.2

24.0

Source: Israel, Central Bureau of Statistics,
No.33. 1982: 134-135.

The

bulk

countries:
Australia
"had

of

the

early

largely from
and

South

immigrants
Europe and

Africa.

different (higher)

came

from

Developed

North America,

and less

"Western"
so from

These predominantly "Western" settlers

water consumption

habits than the indigenous

population" (Naff and Matson, 1984: 33).
Since

1919,

the

majority

of

immigrants

to Israel have, by and

large, been Ashkenazi Jews (i.e. those from Europe, America, Australia,
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and

South Africa

Ashkenazis
(Orni

—"developed") [Table

constituted over

and Efrat,

Sepharadi

one half

1966: 201-202).

Jews (those from

of the

On the

1966:

201-202).

Since

the late 1960s,

total Jewish population

other hand, the Oriental or

Asia and North

constituted 9.8% of the population in
Efrat,

4.2]. Until

Africa —"less developed")

1948 and 28.7% in 1964 (Orni and

then,

steadily out-numbered by the Oriental

the

Ashkenazi

Jews have been

Jews. This is largely due to the

latter group's high birth rates.
Labour
force

statistics from

(most

of

whom

industrial skills
population

was

agricultural
farmers..

So

foundations

1950 show

were

% of the civilian work

that 30

Ashkenazi

immigrants)

(Naff and Matson, 1984: 33).
placed

in

settlements.
the

early

of an

already
They
Jewish

given

immigrants

industrial and

Most of the remaining

established

were

a rapidly

had technical and

villages

and in new

on-the-spot
were

able

training as
to

lay

the

developing Israel, hence

creating a higher standard of living than its neighbours. This, coupled
with the

large number of farming immigrants

translated into a greater

demand for water.
As shown in table 4.3, domestic water consumption in Israel is more
than

fives times

higher

than

November,

higher than

Lebanon.

1978, as

that in

Similarly,

quoted by

Jordan, and

the

Israeli

Kubursi, 1982:

about three times

newspaper

Davar (26

82) reported a wide gap

between the per capita water consumption of Jewish settlers on the West
Bank and

the Arab population in the

same region; the former consuming

100 cubic meters annually, and the latter 40 cubic meters.
Israeli

authorities

imposed

new

strict
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water

After 1967,

regulations

on

the

residents of the West Bank.

Permits to drill water wells in Arab areas

were rarely given, and even

then only for domestic purposes.

policy, according to Davar (26,

This new

November, 1978), was meant to minimize

any interference with the water being pumped to Israel proper from Arab
areas.

So

Jewish

settlements

extracted

in 1977 and on
(then

14 MCM/yr; 88

the occupied West Bank,
inhabited

by

less

17 wells supplying

than

Arab wells (Palestinians

30,000 Israelis)

then numbered about

600,000) were permitted to pump a mere 9.9 MCM/yr (Kubursi, 1982: 82).
This pattern of high water consumption rates domestically is due to
the socio-economic
standard
lawns,

background of the Ashkenazi Jews

of living. European
and running water

Jews tend to

in their homes

and to their high

have swimming pools, green
in Israel. These reasons and

others account for the high rate of domestic water consumption.

Table 4.3
Comparative Water Consumption
[Figures in MCM]

Sector

Israel

Jordan

Lebanon *

Irrigation
Domestic
Industrial

1295
332.5
122.5

465
60
30

670
135
65

TOTAL

1750

555

870

Source: Naff and Matson, 1984.
*.Source: al-Nahar. 5 August, 1985.

63

Table 4.4
Water Consumption in Israel
in MCM

Year

Total

Domestic

Industry

Agriculture

1958 *
1964-65
1969-70
1975-76
1979-80
1980-81
1981-82
1982-83

1274
1329
1564
1728
1700
1679
1770
1759

196
199
240
305
375
367
385
401

055
075
095
090
109
103
103

1075
1249
1328
1235
1212
1282
1255

Sources: Israel, Central Bureau of Statistics, No.36,
1985: 452.
* Darr et. al, 1976.
Although

the Oriental

unskilled
Israeli
the

hands,

wave of

they

generally

.farmers need to

capital to invest

technology

affect

Jewish immigrants
avoided

have some basic
in a large

the

the

brought Israel many
agricultural

technical skills and possess

farm. Capital, farm

feasibility,

sector.

yields,

and

size, and farm

competitiveness of

farms.

4.2.2 Zionism and Agriculture
Zionism

is the political

Israel.

Decades

before

Zionism

had the

theme of

emphasis

on agriculture.

ideology of the

the

establishment

current Jewish state of
of

Israel

"Jews on

the land"

The very

early Zionists

in Palestine,

Consequently a strong
established their

roots and influence in historic Palestine by purchasing arable land and
establishing
Jews."
the

farms

"in

(Kimmerling, 1983

aim of these

areas
87)

which

were only sparsely populated by

According

to Kimmerling (1983

agricultural settlements (or
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87),

Kibbutz) was to create

fait accomplis
United

before the question of Palestine

Nations

(UN).

geopolitics that

Therefore,

it

was

was determined by the

not

always economics but

determined the location of the

Kibbutz.

Most of the

land purchased in Palestine was done through or for the Jewish National
Fund.

By 1939, the

Jews had acquired

10 percent of Palestine, seven

percent of which was cultivable (Kimmerling, 1983: 8 9 ) .

4.2.2.1 The Economic Viability of Subsidised Agriculture.
The ideological commitment to agriculture was initially intended to
make

the new immigrants

secure the
the

feel "rooted" in

their new h o m e — Israel; to

"territorial integrity" of the

country by firmly occupying

peripheral areas; to

security reasons);

make the state

self sufficient in food (for

and to expand the carrying

capacity of the land so

it could accommodate larger numbers of immigrants.
Food self sufficiency was of
state

was in

its infancy

particular concern to Israel when the

years and

immigrants [see tables 4.1 and 4.2].
one as

the country is now

vegetables are

its population was swelling with
This concern is no longer a valid

a net exporter of

exported to the markets of

food. Israeli fruits and

the European Community (EC)

and to the distant markets of North America.
Israel's
substantial

agricultural
government

infrastructure,
assistance"
water is

This is

subsidies.

tax remissions,

(Stauffer, 1985:

highly subsidised.

supply was up

accomplishments

were

Farmers

enjoy

special credit

77). Moreover,
In the

possible

"cheap

or

by
free

facilities and export
the cost

of Irrigation

mid-1970s, Israeli farmers' water

to three times cheaper than water

a significant factor because agriculture
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made

for any other sector.
consumes over 70% of

the total
to

water stock of the

Stauffer

country's

(1985,

irrigated

country.

77), estimate
agriculture

"fraction" of its agricultural

Israeli agronomists, according

that

is

less

than

economically

one half of the

productive

and

a

production is economically viable; "the

rest requires not only water but steady injections of cash subsidies."
This
about

is due

half

of

to the
the

negative "added

agricultural

value per

output"

unit of water for

(Stauffer,

1982:

46-48).

Therefore, economically, Israel would have benefited more

"if it had cut back on costly, highly subsidised agriculture,
rather than capturing still more Arab water with which to
expand its inefficient agricultural output" (Stauffer, 1985:
77).
Stauffer

(1985;

1982)

then

argues

that

the

value

of the coveted

additional water is merely ideological and not economic.

4.2.2.2 Ideology and Israel's Water Policy
The water

policy of Israel is still

fundamentalists of the state.
Zionism

until

Therefore,

1964

after

the period

influenced by the ideological

The water policy in Israel was guided by

which

the

of ideological

role of ideology was dampened.
supremacy was

between 1948 and

1964 after which (1965 till present) ideology became more pragmatic.
In the first period of 1948-1964, the pattern of water distribution
and development

was as follows:

"ideology

dictated policy and policy

guided the planning and operations of the water institutions" (Galnoor,
1980: 293).
planning

The most important

for

dominated.
development

Israel),

and

of these institutions are Tahal (water

Mekorot;

both

of

which

are government

The strong ideological influence necessitated greater water
hence

their

engineering-access
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orientation.

In

this

period, "No

plan for a new agricultural

only because the cost of
293).

settlement was ever abandoned

supplying water was too high" (Galnoor, 1980:

The Israeli government, the sole owner of all water resources in

the state

after the 1959 "Water Law",

providing the
Galnoor

was subsidizing water cost thus

resource far below its real

(1980: 306)

cost of supply.

asserts, "Diseconomies

Therefore,

dictated by ideology" and

manifested in subsidised water costs, "could (temporarily) be tolerated
under

conditions

sufficiency."
In

policy

factors:

started

realized

to

the

less

states vowed,

off.

National

if

merely perceived) water

to

go

and value

was "Water

the modification

This

Water

may

have been due to two

Carrier,

and southern Israel

and secondly, the Israelis

of water

when the neighbouring Arab

the flow of the

constraints that

of the

completed in 1964,

around;

in effect, to reduce

So it

the ideological component of

communities in central

water

the scarcity

trickle.

(even

the present,
wear

water to more

leaving

toward

1965 to

Firstly,

transported

conventional

This, however, could not continue indefinitely.

the period

water

thus

of

of previous

Jordan river to a

exerted strong pressure
ideological imperatives"

(Galnoor. 1980: 297).
Despite
achieved

this

within the

policy is

4.4]

satisfied
it very

ideological

limitations of

objectives

water consumption
so

that

domestic

When this issue

are

water development,

such that agricultural interests

agricultural
Table

pressure,

had to
(urban)

still being
and the water

prevail. In the mid-1960s,

be drastically

curtailed [see

and industrial needs could be

emerged, the Ministry of Agriculture found

difficult to endorse openly a

67

policy of adjusted reallocation

of

water

sectors.

from

the

agricultural

sector

to

other growing and needy

Hence "the policy of assuring priority for the water needs of

urban

and industrial

1980:

298-299).

As

growth was
a result,

started in

general terms" (Galnoor,

some fundamental ideological questions

were raised which affected the structure of political power.
In spite of the looming
factor

of water policy

297-298)

wrote that

water crisis, ideology was still a shaping

in Israel.

the quantity

In

a 1978 article, Galnoor (1980:

of water

continue rising at the previous rates.

for irrigation

could not

He went on to say that "Such a

change in the ideological component of water policy" is yet to occur.
It

must be acknowledged

that as the

gap between water supply and

demand widens, attempts are being made to reallocate agricultural water
[see Table 4.4; note the
to

the domestic and

years 1979-1980 where 75 MCM were reallocated

industrial sectors].

These

attempts are quickly

overridden when drought strikes Israel. This happened in 1981-1982 with
agriculture prevailing once more.
It is now clear

how demographic composition and societal evolution

contribute to the high rate

of water consumption in Israel.

Moreover,

ideology remains an integral component of water policy; one that favors
the agricultural

sector and subsidizes its water

of this high rate of water

supply.

As a result

consumption, water quality is in a state of

degradation.
Specifically, water quality has been of concern in Israel since the
mid-1950s.

This

issue

was

highlighted

in

the

Cotton

Plan

which

suggested the diversion of one third of the Litani river's good quality
water

into

the

Jordan

river

system
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Among other things, this was

supposed to reduce the salinity
(Stevens,

1965).

The

certainly affected
the

two

main

at lake Tiberias by diluting its water

rapid

degradation

Israel's water policy.

problems

that

water

of

the

Salinity

planners

water

stock

has

and pollution are

have

to

control

and

ameliorate.
Salinity is a problem not only in Israel's aquifers but also in the
country's surface

water system, especially in

largest fresh water reservoir.

Salinity in lake Tiberias is caused by,

first, the rate of precipitation
lake,

the lower

salinity

level

winters.

A

the salt
is

high

per season.

content is.
in

lake Tiberias, Israel's

the

dry

As more water enters the

So the seasonally fluctuating
summers,

second reason for lake Tiberias

and lower in the wet

salinity is the high rate

of water evaporation due to the sunny and warm weather.
is

the mineral (salty)

springs at the

A third reason

bottom of the

lake and on its

conference on

Water For Peace

banks (Orni and Efrat, 1966: 78).
The

Israeli representative

to the

(1967, vol.2) noted that water in lake Tiberias contains about 1000 ppm
of total
also said

dissolved solids, of which chloride
that the brackish aquifer in

3000 ppm of total dissolved solids.
chloride

concentrated in

and Sheval, 1985: 438). As
has recommended

accounts for 365ppm.

He

the Negev desert contains upto

Currently, the acceptable level of

agricultural water

is 170-250 mg/1 (Waldman

for drinking water, the Israeli government

that the maximum concentration of

chlorides be set at

250 mg/1 (Shuval, 1980: 315-337).
As the concentration of chlorides
the

concentration of

sodium (salt).
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in Israel's water rises, so does
In the

past, the level of salt

concentration
taste.

in potable

water was

Recently, however, the

judged by

personal objectionable

high sodium concentration

said to have direct health affects

in water is

as it is viewed as a possible cause

of hypertension (Shuval, 1980: 315-337).
Another

form

of

water

contamination

nitrates. This type of water

is

the

accumulation

of

pollution is primarily derived from human

activities as nitrogen salts are rarely found in appreciable quantities
in

natural

water.

coastal aquifers
in

agriculture

Studies

the

water

showed that the intensive
is

a

Nitrogen fertilizers
in

of

major

use of nitrogen fertilizer

contributor

to

are the source of 60%

ground water; 10%

quality of Israel's main

this type of pollution.

of the nitrate level found

from irrigation using

reclaimed waste water and

refuse disposal; another 16% of added nitrates was traced to local well
irrigation, a water source
remaining
fills,

14% is

nitrogen

from a
in

rain

already contaminated with nitrates; and the
variety of
water,

sources including

urban

return

sanitary land

flow, and live stock

excretions (Mercado, 1980: 93-146).
The discussion above identifies the causes and some of the problems
associated
supplies

with
in

the

order

over
to

exploitation

meet

her

of

Israel's

risisng water needs.

existing water
The following

section explores Israel's options to acquire new sources of water.

4.3 Passive Acquisition of New Water Resources
Although
supplies have

Israel's

water

has

been

been fixed since the Arab-Israeli

Scientists have, for many
to

demand

rising, the country's
war of 1967.

Israeli

decades, been looking for scientific answers

their country's incipient

water crisis.
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Importing

water from the

Nile

is another

potential solution

The following section looks

to the

country's water problems.

into Israel's water alternatives which are

broken into two broad categories,

one domestic and the other a foreign

alternative.

4.3.1 The Domestic Prescription
The home-made
scientific

solution to the water crisis

one. Its

major components

in Israel is largely a

are water desalinization, cloud

seeding, and water reclamation.

i. Water Desalinization
The technology for desalting sea
decades.

It is

Mexico, Israel,

implemented to

sources

could be viewed

that was

various degrees

and in many Arab

Israel, its introduction of

water has been available for many

states of the Persian

Gulf.

As for

desal inization plants to develop new water

as an application

of the "access" philosophy

particularly prevalent in the 1950s

levels of

in countries such as

and 1960s.

water consumption were accepted as

The existing

given, and access to new

resources were made a policy-- this time to the Red sea water.
Israel began to experiment with

the desalinization of sea water in

1964; soon after the completion of the National Water Carrier and after
the Arab states pronounced their intention to divert the head waters of
the

Jordan

river

Administration
powered

of

away

from

President

desalinization

plant

Israel.
Lyndon
to

Encouraged
Johnson,

augment

by

the

American

Israel built a nuclear

the country's water needs.

This approach was quickly realized to be uneconomical and, as a result,
Israel

went on to

build two non-nuclear
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desal inization plants in the

town of Eilat,

at the southern tip of the

Negev desert.

These plants

now supply most of the town's potable water needs.
According

to Kahhaleh

(1981: 3 7 ) , in 1973

year desalinization project.
of which

It included three desalination plants all

are to be connected

stage of the scheme.

Israel initiated a 15

with a nuclear reactor

In 1988,

during the final

the total annual output of these plants

is expected to be 155.4 MCM of fresh water.
Writers
that water
be

used

disagree

such as

320) and

Kahhaleh(1981: 37) agree

desalinization is a prohibitively

expensive proposition to

for

Shuval (1980:

anything

on the cost

other

than

drinking.

of desalinated water

per cubic meter; the first

estimates it at

$1.00 to $2.50 and the second

333)

the

estimates

required

capital

desalinization plants capable of

Both writers, however,

at $0.30. Shuval (1980:

investment

needed

to

build

producing 100 MCM/year varies between

$200 million and $300 million.
The
cost

of

Nuclear

safety requirements
nuclear
plants'

in building

energy

and

hence

safety

became

of

nuclear plants increased the

the

cost of water desalination.

great

concern

to

people

and

governments especially after the disasters of Three Mile Island in 1979
in

Pennsylvania, and,

more recently,

the melt

down of the Chernobyl

Nuclear Reactor in the Ukraine in 1986.
Another issue of particular concern to Israel is raised by Naff and
Matson (1984: 12) and by Shuval (1980: 333). They assert that one fifth
of

Israel's

electricity

consumers, most of whom are
pump

water from

production
farmers.

aquifers, from

is

used

water to its

In Israel, energy is consumed to

lake Tiberias
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to. pump

(210 meters

below sea

level), for the country's irrigation system, and for its National Water
Carrier.

This

situation,
imported.

is

placing

especially
As.a

heavy

since

pressure

almost

all

on
of

the

Israel's fuel needs are

result of all the above factors,

build nuclear desalinization plants were

country's energy

the earlier plans to

put on hold in the late 1970s

as the high cost per unit of water could no longer be justified.

ii. Cloud Seeding
Injecting
induce

'

silver iodide and

precipitation

is

a

experimented with in Israel.
is

not a

reliable means

cover over a
then seed.

frozen carbon dioxide

method

that

been

of increasing

Another problem is

seeded clouds is

the

relatively narrow

water supply; one needs cloud
the year which one can

that the location of precipitation from

difficult to predict
state of

Israel.

seeded above lake Tiberias, precipitation
Mediterranean, and not over Israel.
is that clouds

well studied and

One problem with this approach is that it

certain area in a certain time of

the

that is. in

has

into clouds to

and control, especially in
For

example, if clouds were

may occur over Jordan or the

A third problem with cloud seeding

are rarely formed where and when

the arid Negev region during the

they are most needed;

irrigation season -- the

dry summer.

iii. Recycling/Reclaiming Waste Water
Reclamation
reuse

of that water

recycling
plan,

of

of water

it was given

effluents

from

agricultural

for irrigation began
was then
a very low

accepted as
priority.
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settlements and the

in the 1950s.

Although the

part of

the national water

In the

decade beginning in

1950,

Israeli

water

distributional aspect
water

quality.

developing
farmers
This

planners

of water resources and

During

or

this period

expanding

were not

their

the reason

recycling of waste water.
recycling

effluents

municipal

discharges.

water

had

from

reached

effluent.

In

1980

irrigation

projects were

systems.

Despite

this,

meet their rising needs.

Israeli farmers

agricultural

then,
150

"some

and

to suggest the

the 1970s, water reclamation went beyond

small

By

quantitative

paid little attention to

water to

that led

By

the

new agricultural settlements were

irrigation

allocated enough

is largely

waste

emphasised

irrigation projects using reclaimed

in

250

communities to include

number,

small

and

in operation

utilizing
medium

37.5 MCM/yr of

sized waste water

and effectively recycled about

20% of the urban waste water flow" (Shuval, 1980: 219).
Water
300

planners for the

MCM/yr

intensive

of

recycled

Israeli government intend
water.

utilization of 80%

all regions of the country.
to reach.

Associated

environmental
usually

not

contaminants.

and
fit

This

or more of

to

take place through the

the available waste water in

This target may theoretically be feasible

with such an ambitious plan is

social/marketing
for

is

to develop some

drinking

problems.

as

it

In essence, recycling

a complex web of

The recycled water is

continues to have a number of

treated sewage water is recycling

contaminated water. Furthermore, the process of recycling often results
in

waste

Selbst,

water
1980

for

percolating
a

detailed

into

aquifers

study

on

thus polluting them (see

the subject).

Furthermore,

treated and recycled sewage water is regarded by farmers as inferior to
fresh water.

The reasons for that are outlined by Selbst (1980: 250);
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The source of water has an unpleasent association not only
for those who work with it but also for potential customers
so that it may affect the demand for certain produce. There
are possible risks of long-term damage to soil and crop
yields from known and unknown components of sewage. The
commitment to effluent use for irrigation, once made, will be
very difficult to reverse and given the disadvantages and
risks involved it is not surprising that farmers feel that
they have a claim on more than a cubic metre of effluent for
every cubic metre of fresh water they agree to forego.
Thus

for reclaimed sewage

part

of water suppTy,

the

part of

reflect
spite

the government

the

appears

options

discussed

more

is needed;

on

problems

approach

a conventional and routine

exact and responsible

open-mindedness
of

water to become

part

of

associated

above.

This

and an

attitudinal change to

the consumers is essential.
with

economical

agricultural planning on

and
is

In

recycling waste water, this
effective

evident

in

than the other two
the water planners'

decision to seriously pursue effluent reclamation.
4.3.2 The Foreign Prescription.
The foreign options to Israel's
than

the

domestic

ones.

water crisis are even more limited

The

foreign

solution

amounts

acquiring/importing water resources from a neighbouring country.
the

following

discussion

sources of water

focuses

on

to

Hence

the only two natural potential

supply to Israel, namely the Nile

river of Egypt and

the Litani river of Lebanon.
i. The Nile River, The Negev Desert, and Peace
A permanent supply of a
acquired from
only
the

strategic resource like water is best

a stable, friendly and reliable

Arab country that

neighbour. Egypt is the

has diplomatic relations

"Peace Process" between

the two countries
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with Israel.

During

that eventually led to

the

Camp

David

proposed

Accord,

channelling

annually)

into the

desert more

Anwar

one

Sadat,

percent

the

of

Negev desert

the

late President of Egypt,
Nile's water (ie. 800 MCM

of Israel.

inhabitable hence able to

That would have made the

accommodate a larger population

and a more diverse industrial base.
Egypt's
peace and

proposal may

have been

one of

genuine symbolism of

goodwill to Israel.

But after

some reflection, one can see

the political and economic dimensions of such a proposal, especially in
an area

riddled with hostility and

daily, Ha'aretz
water

to

the

dependent

mistrust.

(21 September, 1979), wrote
Negev

settlements

on Egypt.

As a

might

result, and

The influential Israeli
that importing the Nile's

make

Israel

"dangerously"

in addition to water supplies

from the Nile to Jewish settlements in the Negev desert, one suggestion
was

to s-upply

water as well.

the Palestinian
This would

residents of

Gaza Strip with Egyption

have presumably made Egypt reluctant to use

its water "weapon" against Israel.
Shortly after Sadat's approval
and
They

foreign

academics

said that if

projects

would be

politicians

the Nile's water
gravely affected,

production

(Zohra,

explosion

and to its

forecasted to have

and

of the "Peace Canal" project, local

1985).

denounced Sadat's "gesture".

was diverted, Egypt's development
especially in

Furthermore,

due

to

the area

Egypt's population

ambitious agricultural programs,

an annual water deficit of 20,000

of food

the country is

to 60,000 MCM by

the year 2000 (Zuheiri, 1985; Zohra, 1985).
For

Egypt,

sufficiency

is

as

for

a

basic

all

other

goal.

Middle

Eastern states, food self

Exporting

part of a country's water
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resources

is bound

expansion.

to become

a limiting

The immediate effect of

factor to

its agricultural

a food shortage and/or an increase

in food prices are riots and demonstrations, as indicated by the events
that almost toppled Sadat in
responsible

for

the

the mid-1970s, and those that were partly

regime

water-sharing schemes

change

in

could lead to the

Sudan

in

1985.

Therefore,

political instability of both

states, possibly to the economic decline of the supplying state.
While one

state could be in

becoming politically
will" of
Israel
shortage

due

economicaJly,

The "official"

neighbours (i.e.

of water in

Therefore,

it can not risk

unstable, or economically dependent

a once archenemy.
and her

dire need for water,

to

its

even passive

state of hostility between

Syria, Lebanon

the region, renders
explosive

on the "good

and Jordan), and the

this resource non-tradable.
potentials

politically

cross-boundary acquisition

and

of water is an

unlikely venture.
From
East

the discussion

and

in

"national

other

treasure" of strategic

East.

The

scientists,

The

as water, has wide

an environment of

that water in the Middle

similar

significance.

areas

considered a

River diversions have

"peaceful" acquisition

"scientific"

approach,
far no

of a strategic

regional implications, especially in

hostility and mistrust as is the

offers thus

is

socio-economic ramifications with potential for

destabi1ization.

resource such

is clear

environmentally

clear geopolitical and
regional

above, it

vigorously

more than

case in the Middle

explored

a banda.id

by

Israeli

solution to the

incipient water crisis.
The question, therefore, remains: what alternatives are there for a
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developed and
to

advantaged, but water-deficient state

the nature of

the water problem,

entities,

resource to

import by tankers, Israel's solution

crisis

can

only

from

the

Nile,

imports

water

be

a

the

Due

namely that states are immovable

territorial

water

and

like Israel?

being

a

regional
Litani

prohibitively

one.

appears

expensive

to the looming water
Having ruled out water
to

have the remedy to

Israel's water problem.

4.4 The Litani River and Israel's Water Problems
The Litani is Lebanon's longest river.
the

country's

westwards

fertile

Bekaa

passing through the

Mediterranean
flow

and water

near

Baalbeck

sea north

its

and

then

city Sur

near

Sur

a

sharp turn

to empty into the

(Tyre).

inside Lebanese

mouth

takes

narrow coastal strip

of the

sheds are
to

Valley

It flows southwards through

The Litani river's

territory from its springs
(Tyre) on the Mediterranean.

Despite this, Rowley (1984: 145-146) asserts that, for Israel, the lure
of the
its

Litani is double pronged; namely

quantity.

Another

relative

ease with

diverted

to Israel (see

luring

which the

factor

the river's water quality and
is

Litani and

the

inexpensive

and the

the Hasbani rivers could be

Kubursi. 1982; Halawani,

1985) to supplement

and/or replace her existing water sources.

4.4.1 Water Quantity.
The

volume

contention

of

the

but one of

this subject.

The

Litani's

outflow

is

not

contradiction and ambiguity

only

amongst authors on

Litani river's annual flow could be

MCM; it is, however, estimated to average 700 MCM/yr.
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an issue of

as high as 900

Various development
water.

Israel claims

Litani water
about

projects along the Litani
50 % (or about

that over

flows into the sea

100 MCM/yr)

(Naff and

utilize much of its
350 MCM/yr)

unused; Lebanon's figure is

Matson, 1984:

78). On

of the
20 % (or

the other hand,

Thomas Stauffer (July, 1982: 13) contends that a

Complete control of the (Litani) river would add at least 800
million cubic metres per year to Israel's water supply, which
could represent an increase of almost 50 percent of this
critical resource. [Emphasis added]
Stauffer
occupied
river's
Karoun

(July, 1982:

over

one

third

flow area;

4.1].

some-what realistic

same region

his article

of

including

i.e. up

Dam [Figure

uninterrupted.

11-13) wrote
Lebanon,
to a

Stauffer's

This could be

feasible

anarchy,

one

diversion figure

done if the

and opens the dam's

for

two

arms, explosives,

ingredients needed to transform

Second,

Israel

inside

her neigbouring

inside Lebanon
would have
to

are ubiquitous. And these

dams

states including

and other water works

Syria, Jordan

(Naff and Matson, 1984: 78).

point somewhere

The second suggestion is

this suggestion into reality.

attacked

the desired effect of making

a diversion

Dam is destroyed by

First, due to Lebanon's state of

and mercenaries

previously

of 800 MCM is

Israeli army reoccupies the

by her agents.

are the

has

of the

for the Litani to flow

gates, or if the

reasons.

most of the Litani

kilometers north

only if Israel can arrange

"accident", i.e. by Israel or
a

point few

after Israel had

and certainly

Such a subversive action

the Litani flow uninterrupted

along the

western bend

of the river

(Naff and Matson. 1984: 78).
If

the Karoun

dam remains

operational and
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intact, Rowley (1984:

145) suggests that the Litani river's outflow is a mere 100 MCM/yr.
must be noted

here that Rowley's figure is not

It

referenced nor does it

concur with Naff and Matson's analysis (1984: 77-78).

When asked about

the

(letter dated 04

figure

February,

i.n

his

book,

1987) to the

Dr.

Gwyn

Rowley

wrote

author confirming the

figure and stating that

"The Litani data was obtained from Dr. Moshe Inbar of the University of
Haifa" in Israel.
Both Rowley (1984), and Naff and Matson (1984) overlooked a central
point in Israel's hydro-strategy.
100

MCM/yr, its flow

Khardali

[Figure

southwards.

amounts to 400

4.1]; the

This

Although the river's outflow may be
MCM/yr at the

ideal

point

for

point is ideal because of

western bend near

diverting

the

river

the shere volume of water

flow there, the proximity of the river bend to Israel (fewer than 10 km
away
the

from the border),
Khardali and

and the relative

the territory

to its

elevation difference between
south east, a difference that

will allow for the gravitational flow of water in the diversion canals.
One of

Rowley's (1984), and Naff and

Matson's (1984) explanations for

the Israeli occupation of the so called "security belt" is "the lure of
the Litani".

However, what both

hydrological

resources of

authors fail to discuss are the other

that belt,

namely the

water aquifers, the

Hasbani and the Wazzani rivers of that region in south east Lebanon.
Academics and reporters from Lebanon believe that Israel can divert
far more than the estimated and
the

Litai water

river's

water

attempts to

per year.
has

been

normally accepted figure of 100 MCM of

Additionally, 157
used

by

Israel

develop that resource after the
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MCM/yr of

since

the Hasbani

it foiled Lebanon's

1967 War (Halawani, 1985:

54).

Moreover,

the

former

director-general

Authority (the government department
Project), Salah
divert 400
recent

hydrological studies,

Nahar (24
addition

Lebanon's most

water from

Litani

Water

that Israel could easily

into her own water

March, 1986), has recently
to that,

the

in charge of executing the Litani

Halawani (1985: 5 5 ) , asserts

MCM/yr of the Litani

of

systems. Based on

circulated newspaper, aj.

confirmed Halawani's figures. In

the Wazzani

river (a

tributary to the

Hasbani) has been piped southwards for use in Israel's northern region,
the

Galilee. This

received

by the

is according
author from

to a

letter recently (4 April, 1987)

Dr. Rowley,

a geographer from Sheffield

University who is currently doing research on Israel's water needs.
Baalbaki

and

Mahfouth

(1985:

interests in the water resources

88-107)

to divert these resources

out that the

flow of the Litani (between the

Baalbaki

(1985) are

ground water potential of south
imperatives.

Replenishable

Mount Hermon to the east
to be

southwards.

and that of the Wazzani is

and Mahfouth

100 MCM/yr; and by

analysed

Israel's

of southern Lebanon, and detailed how

Israel plans

is 400 MCM/yr,

have

The authors point

Karoun dam and Khardali)

67 MCM/yr [see Figure 4.1].

probably the

first to

discuss the

Lebanon in terms of Israel's hydraulic

subterranean

water

in

the foothills of

are estimated by Baalbaki and Mahfouth (1985)
aj Nahar (24 March,

1986) to be billions of

cubic meters in volume.
A

foreseeable

diversion

already in place is that from

scheme

for

which the infrastructure is

the Litani near the village of Khardali,

and from the Wazzani river (Baalbaki and Mahfouth, 1985: 88-107).

From

there, water from the Litani and the Wazzani rivers will be pumped to a
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point

400 m above

sea level to

join Israel's National Water Carrier.

This scheme will provide Israel with over 450 MCM of water per year.

4.4.2 Water Quality
Twenty
Tiberias

five
which

percent
is

of

largely

Israel's
fed

by

water
the

supply

Jordan

comes from lake

river.

Despite the

construction of the National Water Carrier, the Jordan river's water is
not reaching

the cultivable Negev desert

The

for

reasons

Tiberias is
coastal

the

latter

are

two

required for the urbanized

parts of Israel.

in the envisaged quantities.
fold:

first, water from Lake

and industrialized central and

The springs and

coastal aquifers that once

supplied the urbanized north and central parts of the country have been
over utilized hence their
Lake's salinity varies
its

southern end. This

water quality is deteriorating.

from 250 ppm at its northern
salinity level is

Second, the

end to 340 ppm at

too high for some sensitive

and pervasive crops, like citrus fruit trees.
Salinity of the Litani river
Matson (1984: 65)
attractive
Carrier

to the

write that "it is purity that
Israelis, who

System with a

quality)

water."

averages about 20 ppm, hence Naff and

have developed

view towards potable

This point

makes the Litani very
their National Water

(as opposed to irrigation

is pursued further

by Rowley (1984: 46)

who notes that it is important to recognize that even 100 MCM/yr of the
Litani's water "equals 25 percent of the flow with in the much heralded
Israeli

National Water Carrier."

therefore,

benefit vast

The diversion of

areas in

Israel, far
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the Litani would,

beyond the central and

western

parts

of

the

country.

reaches

the National Water

Once

the

pure water of the Litani

Carrier [see Figure

channelled as far south in

4.1] it would then be

Israel as the cultivable Negev desert, thus

"making it bloom."

4.5 Geopolitical Analysis of Water Scarcity
Water

transfer

from

Lebanon

into

geopolitical .consequences that affect
In the following section,

Israel has many inter-related

each country in a different way.

the geopolitical and socio-economic value of

water to both Israel and Lebanon are analysed.

4.5.1 The Value of Water to Israel
Israel is currently tapping over 95 percent of its proven renewable
water resources of 1600 MCM/yr. Today Israel is consuming over 1750 MCM
annually,

this includes

desalinated and

water from the West Bank and
(Banias

tributary), and

reclaimed water,

as well as

to a lesser degree from the Golan Heights

from south

Lebanon (the

Hasbani tributary).

Galnoor (1980: 304-305) asserts that even

the estimated additional water would not suffice to meet the
growth in water demand expected up to 1990. The situation may
be even worse if the precipitation is below average during
this period and if the demand for higher quality water is
accelerated.
He

then

adds

technological

that

in

the

breakthrough

absence
in

producing

Galnoor (1980: 304-305) believes is
the

most

optimistic

forecasts

of

are

1985."
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curtailed
"artificial

demand or of the
water,"

which

unlikely in the near future, "even
gloomy about the prospects after

The Israeli newspaper Haaretz,

in an article entitled "The Dispute

Over Water", as quoted by Davis (1979: 5 ) , stated that

the future increase in urban population and in standards of
living will necessitate the development of some additional
400 MCM of water toward 1990 [and 800 MCM by the year 2000,
when Israel's water consumption will be 2,500 MCM annually
(Naff and Matson, 1984: 53)]. If the needed quantity is not
found, water have to be diverted from agriculture to domestic
consumption.
Against

this

background

supplies, coupled with an
is

a consensus

rising

water

demands

and

limited

ideological supremacy in water policy, there

in Israel's

will have to be taken in

of

water community

that "some drastic steps

order to cope with water shortages" (Galnoor,

1980: 304). The steps that Galnoor suggests involve a 15-20% reduction
in

the total

problem

agricultural water

with this

politically
entrenched
affiliations

suggestion is

risky.
in

the

The

consumption by
that it

"spiritual"

Israeli

society,

and orientations.

by the

year 2000

is unpopular

value

2000.

One

and therefore

of agriculture is deeply

and it transcends all political

Another problem

reduction in agricultural water consumption
MCM

the year

is that

even a 20 %

will at best amount to 150

--currently, agricultural

water consumption is

waste water reclamation will add

about 400 MCM by the

close to 1300 MCM.
Reliance on
year

1990 (Galnoor, 1980:

first, heavy

300).

Here two

issues must be remembered:

reliance on water reclamation is

energy and requires capital
initial studies on the

a process that utilizes

outlays, thus higher water costs.

Second,

environmental and health impacts resulting from

treated and reused water have revealed unfavorable results (see Shuval,
1980: 211-242 for

a full discussion).
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In spite of

all this, and even

if

by the year

2000, Israel was

able to augment

500-600 MCM/yr, that would still
of

800 MCM/yr.

This would

her water supply by

not meet her forecasted water deficit

keep Israel

hostage to

its water needs,

especially in drought years or in times of population expansion.

Furthermore,
consequences on
of key

shortage

of

water

the Israeli economy.

could

In a

economic indicators in the Israeli

concluded
drop

a

in

that water has
water

skyrocket,

and its

the

shadow

added value

grave

economic

study of the shadow prices
economy, Kubursi (1982: 99)

the highest shadow

supplies,

have

price. So if

price

will rapidly

of

the

there is a

resource

will

decline thus negatively

impacting the Israeli economy.

Israel is clearly in need of new water resources merely to maintain
the

current rate

MCM/yr

of water

of the Litani

irrigate
weekly

consumption.

water is diverted

25,000 more hectares
magazine al-Tadamun

increase its

It

is estimated that if 150

southwards, Israel could then

which in turn,

(April 1984:

according to the Arabic

6 8 ) , would

population by 25 percent, or

permit Israel to

one million immigrants. For

Israel, such a population boost could "translate into an increase of 25
percent

of its mobilization

force, which is

an increase of about 1.4

mi 11 ion draftees."
Baalbaki and

Mahfouth (1985) believe that

Israel could divert 450

MCM of water annually from both the Litani and the Wazzani rivers.
authors assert
irrigated
the

that 350 MCM of

land by 70,000

domestic/potable

water will allow Israel

hectares, and the

needs

of

1.25
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The

to expand her

remaining 100 MCM to meet

million

Jewish

immigrants.

Moreover, additional water sources would certainly be needed if tens of
thousands of Russian Jews are to
that society.

emigrate to Israel and be absorbed in

The early waves of immigrants

have had a similar effect

on the rate of water consumption in the country.
For

Israel to

international

remain or

Jewish body

and to

living and development in the
would

be

difficult

to

indeed regain

its attractiveness to the

its own

citizens, the

standard of

country must be increased sharply.

achieve

if

the

country

was

to

conserve/ration water or reallocate it away from agriculture.
rate of

water consumption, the subsidy of

intensive

aesthetic and

try

This
and

The high

the resource, and the water

recreation facilities

will therefore have to

continue.
If
Matson

the current

pattern of

(1984: 12)

contend that

water consumption
Israel will

continues, Naff and

have depleted all of its

renewable sources of fresh water "by the mid 1990s, which adds critical
complicating factors
West

Bank,

suffering

the
the

to the issue of its

Golan

Heights,

economic

set

and

backs

shortages, Israel will finally divert

[Israel's] occupation of the

southern

Lebanon."

associated

with

Instead of

severe

water

the Litani into the Jordan river

system [see Figure 4.1].
A

number of

remain

Israeli politicians

in Israel's

"sphere of

believe that

south Lebanon must

influence", because

they believe that

only the Litani offers a solution to their country's water crisis (Naff
and

Matson,

governments

1984).
under

This
two

would

partially

different

leaderships

explain
(Shamir

why two Israeli
for the Likud

party, and Perez for Labour) have been unwilling to pull out of Lebanon
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completely. This is also underlined by the fact that both party leaders
have headed two minority
Matson

(1984:

irrigation

79)

coalition governments.

note

that

Arab

countries'

reconstruction and development

(for use

by indigenous Lebanese) in the

Furthermore, Naff and
promises "to finance

schemes in southern Lebanon
event of an Israeli withdrawl

may well impede Israeli willingness to withdrawl."

4.5.2 The Value of Water to Lebanon
Since
always
other

independence in 1943,

given
water

build a

related

power

projects.

generation

For

the Litani river.

farmers and from the World

incorporate
Initially,

irrigation
the

into

government

any possible

the

a priority over any

this purpose, Lebanon planned to

series of dams, mostly along

the local

avoid

hydro-electrical

Lebanon's successive governments have

Bank convinced the government to
hydro-electric

avoided

Pressure from

the

sectarian outcries

generation

plan.

irrigation issue in order to
accusing it

of setting

up an

irrigation scheme favoring one sect over another. Some years later, the
government

finally approved

irrigation

schemes

with

the "Litani

Project", which incorporated

hydroelectrical

power

generation plans.

A

government agency known as the "Litani Authority" was founded to manage
the Project.

i. The Litani Project
By

the

mid-1970s,

increased sharply
This was
schemes

the

area

of

but it was still far

essentially due to the slow
undertaken

irrigated

by

the

in Lebanon had

below the country's potential.
implementation of the irrigation

government.
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land

The Litani project has been

described by

Sayigh (1978) and Fisher (1985)

as a crowning example of

slowness, indecision and wastefulness.
"The

Litani

Project,

hydroelectricity.
the

as

water.

who

wanted

The urgency

was

exclusively for

been applied to

use some of

(Hudson, 1971: 9 ) . This pressure was being

internally, by local

governments

realized,

Recently, pressure has

water for irrigation"

applied

(first)

to

farmers, and externally
mitigate

was partly

by various Arab

any foreign threat to Lebanon's

sparked by

Israeli charges

that the

Litani's water was "flowing uselessly" into the sea and their expressed
interest

in

sharing

that

resource

(Gilmour,1984;

Naff and Matson,

1984).
After
loan

much debate, the

from the World

Bank, approved the

irrigation and hydroelectric
backing,

the

Lebanese government, with

project

insufficient background

Litani Project which included

generation plants.

suffered

the aid of $24m

from

many

data on the river's

Despite its financial
setbacks

due

to

(1)

flow; (2) inefficiency or

non-existence of aerial surveys, soil analysis, and research on farmers
attitudes and the like; (3) false starts; (4) change in priorities; (5)
defective
other

work performance (resulting

serious and

costly results);

in the collapse
and (6)

large landlords, and political pressure

of tunnels and

disagreements (among the

groups allied with them) as to

the course of irrigation canals and the altitude which irrigation water
is to reach. (Sayigh, 1978; Hudson, 1971).
The first phase of the Litani plan was completed.in 1965. The Litani
Authority built
valley.

a dam on the

The dam created an

southern part of the

river in the Bekaa

artificial lake capable of holding 225 MCM
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of water. Both the lake and the dam were named after the bordering town
of Karoun.

ii. Irrigation And its Problems
The other aspect of the Litani project was irrigation. The complete
irrigation

plan was expected

three different
patches

to provide water

areas: "part of the

of ^ood

land

in

the

for 26,000 hectares in

southern Biqa' (Bekaa), scattered

Galilean

Uplands,

Sidon-Beirut coastal

area" (Hudson, 1971: 8 ) . The

later

the

dropped

from

plan

only

to

and

parts of the

last two areas were

expand

the

southern

Bekaa

irrigation scheme.
The

irrigation part

hydro-electric

one.

irrigation plan

has

the

the

overwhelming problem facing the

to any development project).

to

provide $50 million

advance

or

grant

Despite this assistance, budgetary
hampered

implemented slower than the

is financial (obviously, the on-going

in principle to

promised

Plan was

Currently,

overriding impediment
agreed

of the

quick

allocation

LL

civil war is an

The World Bank has

of credits, and Abu Dhabi

150 million for the project.

constraints due to war damages have
of

funds

and

caused

a

slow-paced

execution of the project. By 1975 both the coastal and Bekaa irrigation
schemes were to be completed.

However, only the basic irrigation works

for

completed

the

Bekaa

scheme

were

maintenance of this basic
is

currently affected

and

became

operational. The

irrigation system (canals, pipes, pumps ...)

by the

instability in

the country which often

renders the system un-operational.
The

first

two

implemented. They

stages

of

the

Litani

included the development of

89

development Plan has been
an irrigation system in

the

central

Bekaa,

generating plants.
to

irrigate

Lebanon,

building

The third and

thousands

and. to

the

of

generate

enough

dam and a reservoir at the
Litani.

According

government has been
sovereignty over
and

according

acquire

a

of agricultural land in southern
hydroelectricity

to

and Matson

the south to the Israelis
Lebanese

loan

the

Khardali, just north of the western bend of
(1984: 74), "the Lebanese

unable to implement this stage due

to

satisfy

This necessitated the construction of a

to Naff

institutions", influenced
to

last stage of this Plan was intended

hectares

domestic needs of that region.

the

Karoun dam and hydroelectric power

sources,

and the PLO."
"U.S.

by the Israeli lobby,

from

the

to the loss of
Furthermore

government

financial

blocked Lebanon's bid

World Bank for its development schemes

(Stauffer, 20 January, 1982).

iii. Water As a Factor of Stability.
Now that the
obstacle

to

government
country.

PLO is out of south Lebanon,

development
in

The

Beirut,

is
able

re-emergence

the

rebirth

to
of

of

reestablish
an

the only real remaining
an
the

effective

and

effective

central

sovereignty of the
uniting

Lebanese

government is partly dependent on its willingness to address the plight
and

grievances

Muslims.

They

of

the

country's

largest minority group, the Shiite

are estimated to number over

850,000, and seem to live

in higher concentrations in southern Lebanon than any where else in the
country.

Most of the

Shiite, especially those

poor farmers that have always

in south Lebanon, are

been largely neglected by the government

in Beirut.
The lack

of government programs to help
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develop south Lebanon led

essential

steps; in their

absence, the South

can not be economically

developed, thus Lebanon will neither regain its political stability nor
its

unity.

Israel

Therefore,

away .from

irrigation

would

the

selling
Shiite

foment

or

diverting the Litani's water into

farmers

resentment

who do not receive enough for

against

the Christian-dominated

government of Lebanon (Naff and Matson, 1984).

TABLE 4.5
Irrigated and Irrigable
Area Requirements
Irrigated
Area (ha)

District

Irrigable
Area (ha)

Total
(ha)

N. Lebanon
20,000
Mount Lebanon
9,000
Bekaa
18,000
Southern Lebanon 7,000

7,000
33,000
48,000

27,000
9,000
51,000
55,000

TOTAL

88,000

142,000

54,000

Source: Fawaz, 1967: 297. These are also the
most recent provincial figures.

TABLE 4.6
Lebanon: Available Water Supply
and Projected Demand [*]

District

Water
supply
in 1967

Water
demand
in 1985

Water
demand
in 2005

N. Lebanon
Mount Lebanon
Beirut
Beqaa
South Lebanon

110,000
160,000
125,000
52,000
103,000

107,000
118,000
132,000
62,000
73,000 ,

144.000
158,000
177,000
83,000
98,000

TOTAL

550,000

492,000

660.000

Source: Van der Leeden, 1975: 240.
* All figures are in cubic meters per day.
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iv. Current and Future Water Needs.
In 1984,

Lebanon's water consumption was

estimated to be 870

MCM/yr [Table 4.3], which is less than the supplied
year.

On the

other hand,

Al-Hawadith weekly

volume in an arid

news magazine estimated

that

Lebanon's population in the year 2000 will be about five
million persons, (compared to three millions in 1984). The
irrigated area' will have to be enlarged to 200,000 hectares
(compared to 60,000 ha in 1984), ... the water requirements
in the year 2000 will be close to the supply of an ordinary
year which is 2,250 MCM (al-Hawadith. May 11, 1984: 52).
Therefore, by
Other

the year 2000 Lebanon will

forecasts

p.80),

are

the World

abundance of

gloomier.

Bank reports

barely meet its water needs.

According

to Naff and Matson (1984,

that although

water resources", it may "face

Lebanon "has a relative
critical shortages in the

near future for both domestic and agricultural usage."

4.6 Summary
Israel's
reinforced

pattern
by

the

of

high

country's

water

consumption

ideology,

is established and

Zionism.

The

country

is

utilizing all of its available and replenishable water resources. Since
demand

for

water

supplementing

is

out-stripping

her water resources

lesser extent from desal imzat ion.
has

led to

result

of

the over-pumping
which

sea

water

Israel

from effluent reclamation

has

been

and to a

This high rate of water consumption

of the
has

supplies,

country's coastal

been

seeping

aquifers as a

into them.

Domestic

attempts to augment Israel's water supplies have been partly successful
but

offer

country.

no
The

real

solution

to

the

deepening

only feasible option left for
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water crisis in the

Israel is to divert south

Lebanon's water resources into the National Water Carrier.
Diverting the
water

Litani into Israel will

problems but

create deeper

diversion can.only be made
of

south

Israeli
will

Lebanon,

or

kill any

political problems

for Lebanon.

A

possible by either overt Israeli occupation

by

a

created and supported

not only

likely solve that country's

covert

occupation by proxy through the

"South Lebanese Army."

irrigation or

So a diversion

development plans intended for

south Lebanon, it will keep that country destabilized and in turmoil.
A diversion

of the Litani will certainly

fan the fires of hatred,

mistrust, and renewed conflict; it will also re-enforce Arab suspicions
of the
have

expansionist nature of Israel.
destabilizing political

Diverting Lebanon's water will

ramifications in

the whole region which

could quite easily develop into a another Syrian-Israeli war. Moreover,
the

chances of finding

conflict will

a peaceful solution

to the wider Arab-Israeli

become slimmer or vanish completely

if such a diversion

takes place.
These facts have politicized and internationalized the Litani river
"dispute".
within

This

case

the framework of

study

of

water

conflict will next be tested

conflict theory as

this thesis.
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discussed in Chapter 2 of

C H A P T E R

F I V E

Analysis of Conflict Theory
And
Water Scarcity

The

conflict over

century

old. This

water demands and
Lebanon.

This

water between

conflict is

Lebanon and

being remanifested

the depletion of the resource in

chapter sets out to test

water scarcity

in the Middle East within

water

due

complementary
and Lebanon.
not

her

explanation to
So

need

for

the state

Israel and also in

Four that Israel's looming

greater

resources

is

but

a

of hostilities between Israel

the motif in this chapter is

this "scarcity induced

the rising

the already discussed theory

It was determined in Chapter
to

due to

almost a

the nature and development of

of conflict.
crisis

Israel is

to determine whether or

conflict" follows the

model depicting the

process and phase of conflict presented in Chapter Two (Figures 2.1 and
2.2).
Scarcity

of

water

contributing factor to

in

the

Middle

East

is

rarely

viewed as a

Arab-Israeli hostilities, most recently between
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Lebanon

and

Israel.

The

approach

taken

analysis, correlation and integration
geopolitical) between

in this chapter is one of

of events (social, economic, and

the two Middle Eastern

theory. Each phase of the model

antagonists and conflict

of conflict process is tested with the

corresponding events in the case study.

A modification of the model in

Chapter Two is offered as a refinement that better describes the reason
for and

path of conflict process in

involve,

in particular,

the word

"time" factor to the conflict
by

the

structure

balancing of

of

the present context.
"trigger", the

introduction of the

process, and the additional role assumed

expectations

power phase.

The changes

as

an

influencing factor in the

The revised model,

depicted in Figures 5.1

and 5.2, is discussed in the latter part of this chapter.

5.1 A Latent Water Conflict
The essence of water conflict
state

"competition"

incompatibility
evolution of

of their

this
interests.

limited
The

the

it the seeds of a

This may be called the latent conflict phase.

but latent water

indigenous

hence

natural environment and the

result of the geopolitical setting,

inherent

resource,

the geopolitical setting embody within

latent conflict.
As a

for

between Israel and Lebanon is one of

population

was

there had always been an

conflict in historic
sparsely

comprised prosperous traders and

scattered

Palestine. There, the
across

the

land and

subsistence farmers. Hence the latent

water conflict was onsetting on the area in a very slow fashion.
As

discussed

formulated

in

setting, an area

a

in

Chapter

European

Four,

setting

Zionism
for

implementation

referred to by the Jews as
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is an ideology that was
in

an Asian

the "Promised Land."

One

basic premise of Zionism was to create a Jewish State in this "Promised
Land"

to which millions

important

of Jews in

pillar of Zionism

turned out

diaspora will immigrate.

is its emphasis

to be, a largely arid

Another

on agriculture in, as it

and water-deficient land.

Naturally

this was a disrupting

challenge to the existing ethno-political status

quo

and

in

the

natural

region,

environment.

to

The

the

existing passive relation with the

aridity

of

the

natural

environment

in

Palestine made Zionist leaders instantly aware of water scarcity in the
country.

So as early

as 1918, the

Zionists of Europe were demanding

that the

Litani river be included within

promised

to

them

by

Britain.

They

the boundaries of Palestine,
must

have

realized that --in

addition to the availability and use of technology, and the presence of
socio-political

organizations

to

manage

and

direct

technological

applications—

The numbers of people any given piece of territory can
support — a n d their standard of living-- may be expected to
depend also upon
their ability to supplement domestic
resources with materials from the outside (North, 1977: 583).
As

a source

scarcity was.

of potential

conflict, latent

for decades, only felt by

was due to Zionist-funded hydrological
centrality

of agriculture

Palestine

were

not

as

and hence
aware

limitations

of their

traditional

farming and trading

actively

challenged by

rapid population

country.

or

studies of the area,

even

Zionism.

concerned

was due

to the

about

This

and to the
The Arabs of
the

water

fact that their

life styles were . not yet affected or

the Zionists:

expansion.

one side, the Zionists.

water to

This

awareness of resource

nor did

Moreover, due to
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the Arabs anticipate a
the pro-Zionist British

Mandate

over

influence
their

Palestine,

of the

destiny.

Israel,

the

Zionists, the
Therefore,

and -the

opposing

and

challenges

of the

political

native Arabs

of

problem of

an

alien

organization and

had little control over

the geo-political

values and attitudes.

awareness

great

setting of
ideology

These factors, as
water scarcity

Lebanon and

created biases,

well as the latent

correspond well with the

first phase in the model of conflict process.
So

at this

stage of

the water

conflict, latent

direct and an immediate consequence of Zionism.
an

early factor

opposition

in the

to the

conflict process,

pattern of

awareness was a

So while awareness was

it did not initiate active

water distribution

and/or utilization;

that is, it did not initiate conflict.

5.2 Conflict Initiation and Active Awareness
This

early

passively latent
tensions

Zionist

of

resource

until the 1950s and the

over the Jordan

Arab-Israeli War.
violent

awareness

water were a

These

contributing cause to the 1967

first and the

the process of conflict over water.

remained

Jordan river dispute.

So the Jordan river dispute

conflict constitute the

scarcity

and its culmination in
only complete cycle in

The outcome of this conflict cycle

was not just a territorial victory but a resource victory for Israel as
she increased her water supply by

over 400 MCM/yr, or 40% of her total

water needs.
A

1964

Arab

neighbours to

Summit

adopted

a resolution that required Israel's

develop and divert (away from

Jordan river's tributaries at their source.
greatly

reduce

the

water

flow

Israel) the waters of the
This strategy was meant to

into lake Tiberias, Israel's largest
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fresh

water reservoir.

Soon

after its attempt

to divert the Hasbani

waters toward the Yarmouk river

of Jordan, Lebanon became boldly aware

of

water interests

the incompatibility

Thereupon,

the

latter

development sites
Syria.

this

struck

entered the phase of

move

at

with those of Israel.

the

water

by

point when the latent

conflict initiation.

underscore the value
Israel

diversion and

also inside Jordan and

this could be viewed as the

was intended to

aggressive

country

not only inside Lebanon, but

For Lebanon

water conflict

of her

transformed

For Israel,

it attaches to water. This
its once latent and opposing

attitude into active and opposing interest.
During

this

phase

(1964-1982)

of

conflict

initiation, Israeli

leaders began to once again express interest in sharing or buying water
resources

from Lebanon.

In

Israel's" territorial gains

the wake of
from three

Dayan, the Defence Minister of

the June War
of its

of 1967 and of

four neighbours, Moshe

that country, stated that (as quoted by

Hof, 1985: 36) Israel had achieved "provisionally satisfying frontiers,
with the

exception of those with Lebanon."

the Litani's water was

Israel later charged that

flowing wastefully into the Mediterranean (Naff

and Matson, 1984).
Being

a disadvantaged

state economically

became active in developing the
part,

this was intended

interest

in,

and

resource potentials of the Litani.

to silence Israel's

claims

to

and militarily, Lebanon

the

river;

In

charges and disperse her
a typical internal (versus

international) policy response and passive behaviour on the part of the
weaker
have

power when
here

may

be

challenged by
called

an

a stronger

one.

Therefore, what we

active awareness (as opposed to latent
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awareness)
needs.

of water scarcity

reflected in Lebanon's

The incompatibility of

these two outcomes

use and Israel's
were manifested in

the opposing interests of both countries, Lebanon and Israel.
5.3 The Balancing and Balance of Power
And Israel's Response to the Water Crisis
In the phase of balancing of

power, the path or policy chosen by a

state (be it coercive, non-coercive, or accommodation) directly affects
and

influences

credibility)
decisions

each

in the

component
balance of

considered

in

the

(i.e.

interest,

power phase.
balancing

to ensure their highest potential

balance

power;

of

initiating state.

otherwise,

they

Hence the

phase

measured so

could

Therefore, due to this

capability,

have

and

policies or

to be carefully

of yielding the desired
be

detrimental

to

the

inter-connectedness of both

phases, they will be tested together in the same section.
Due

to

technical

its

solution

Nile-to-Negev
cases,

growing
to

the

water

all

those acquired

of

Israel

a

and
water

recurring

moved into the
conflict

of an official

(2) the

lack of

has had to

from the "security

the

The gap

failure of the

develop (and in some

replenishable

for

By

its

water

resources,

between water supply and

1978 invasion of Lebanon,

balancing of power
water.

Israeli request to
overt or

and

been widening, thus pushing the country

uncertainty.

seems to have

country's
absence

hydraulic

the prohibitively expensive

problem,

its

in 1967.

demand in Israel has gradually
towards

demands,

canal proposal, Israel

over-develop)

including

water

However,

due

phase in the
to (1) the

import water from Lebanon,

significant coercive efforts to divert

zone", the water

conflict starts to diverge

from the process of conflict model suggested in Figure 2.1.
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There were apparently no pressing or sudden hydrological reasons to
"trigger" Israel's large scale invasions
in

1982.

By

and

large,

the

only

invasions is the "security zone";
the

battles

mostly

that

ensued

been free from

(who are

geopolitical

evidence of these

in other words, and not withstanding

during

the

invasion period, this zone has

security or water-induced

all the dust from both invasions
soldiers

of Lebanon in 1978 as well as

conflicts.

So after

settled, Israel still has 1000 of its

regularly attacked)

as "advisors"

to the

SLA, an

"army" of local Lebanese trained, armed, and financed by Israel.
Having established
and in

that the declared objectives

1982 have not been

met, why is it

human and economic costs of

of Israel in 1978

still willing to suffer the

maintaining the "security zone"?

Is there

a hydraulic dimension to this zone?

5.4 A "Security" Belt or a Hydraulic One?
Although

Israel

has

not

shortages, it is expected to
So Israel's
"security

yet

suffered

in

any

severe

water

become water-deficient in about 20 years.

early (1976) involvement in, and
belt"

from

southern

Lebanon

context of two plausible scenarios:

could

its (1978) creation of a
be explained within the

one is related to security and the

other to long-term hydro-strategies.

5.4.1 The Security-related Scenario.
The

1978

commandos'
invasions
they

and

raids

1982
on

invasions

Israeli

were too extensive

constituted

a

bold

were both triggered by Palestinian

citizens

and diplomats.

to be considered

test

of
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Indeed, these

as merely retaliatory;

the status quo between Israel and

Lebanon.

What

was

the

desired

outcome

of

this

test?

In

both

invasions, the official objective of Israel was to protect its citizens
not only at home but also abroad from the menace of terrorism eminating
from

Lebanon.

southern

Israel

Lebanon

sought

"terrorist

to

pursue

free",

and

this
by

objective

establishing

by making
a

narrow

"terrorist free" area which became to be known as the "security zone."
The
the

immediate (but short-lived)

expulsion of

outcome of of

Palestinian guerrillas

both invasions was

("terrorists") from southern

Lebanon. Moreover, in spite of its occupation-by-proxy of the "security
zone", Israel claims to have
is proven by (1) the

no territorial ambitions in Lebanon. This

"voluntary" withdrawl of Israel's troops from the

large areas they occupied in 1978

and in 1982; and (2) by transferring

the command of the "security zone" over to a local militia known as the
"South Lebanese Army" or SLA [Figure 5.3].
In

spite of the

severe

blows

to

"security belt", and

Palestinian

commandos

of the two
in

(1978 and 1982)

southern Lebanon, Israel

continues to be attacked —perhaps on a smaller scale, and it continues
to

retaliate.

(which often
and

they

Israel's
(who

It

important

to

note that many of these attacks

use rockets) originate from

are

increasingly

eviction of

have been

creation

is

carried

the Palestinian

returning in

of this "security

outside the "security zone",

out

by Lebanese citizens.

commandos from Southern Lebanon

large numbers,
belt" have both

and re-arming),

and her

failed to yield peace and

security, the sole declared objective of Israel.
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Thus

5.4.2 The Water-related Scenarios
The

hydro-strategic

considered

as

an

significance

explanatory

occupation-by-proxy of
Chapter

Four

that

the

problem is an

outbreak
Israel
Thus

of civil
to

the

southern

factor

to

only

feasible

Israel's

solution

war in

strengthen

Lebanon in

her

of

long-term

the

continued

It was deduced in
(in

terms of water

of the resource) to Israel's growing

external one, namely

creation

Lebanon is rarely

territory in south Lebanon.

quality, volume and the proximity
water

of

from southern Lebanon.

1975 was

The

an opportune time for

political posture with Lebanon.

"security

zone"

in 1978 has made Israel

strategically positioned to have greater access to resources.
Against
presented.

this

background,

First,

position -to

three

Israel would have been in

negotiate

a

water

government in Lebanon --had the

sub-scenarios are

water-related

sharing

a weak if not impossible

agreement

with the central

latter country's civil war ended as it

then appeared like it might.
Second,

since

the

Litani

river

development and stability of Lebanon,
or bargain away the river's water.
belt" put Israel in a position
sharing
Litani
latter

agreement, or

say 20

years or

(the

West Bank

At

indeed illegally

[Figure 5.3].

have

"security belt."

Having realized that, the "security

from which it can either extort a water

would

repercussions,

of utmost importance to the

the country is unlikely to share

unilaterally, and

waters southwards
one,

is

minimal

Both options, especially the
regional

so after

referred to
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by its

and

international

Israel's occupation

that time, this belt may take

is now

divert the

of the

on a biblical name

Judaic names,

Judaia and

Figure 5.3

Security Belt of South Lebanon

•

Israel Defence Force

o
•

Israel Defence Force and/or SLA
South Lebanon Army
S o u r c e s : The Economist, Sept. 27, 1986

•

Security Zone

UN Security Council, April 1 1 , 1985: S / 1 7 0 9 3

104

Samaria) or become known as
episode

of

the

West

occupation/hegemony

the occupied "North Bank".

Bank,

of

the

a

period

of

"security

stable

belt"

Similar to the

and

well managed

is needed before Israel

could begin her exploitation of south Lebanon's water resources.
Third,

shortly

after

the

creation

ground water wells were shut down.
water flow

They were said to have affected the

in the Hasbani river and

the belt is

of the "security belt", many

in its tributaries.

a means of preventing Lebanon from

Furthermore,

utilizing its share of

these rivers, and from fully developing the waters of the Litani.
In
the

short, Israel'e

innovative foreign

option of accommodation

possibility
"security

of

resources.

through the bargaining

manipulating

belt"),

or

the

These are long

policy approach leaves her

—ie.black
coercive

mailing—

process (with the
Lebanon

with the

route to acquire south Lebanon's

term policy options

that may be activated

when a water crisis eventually befalls the state of Israel.

Summary
Israel

has

never

clearly

declared

resources is one of its objectives
particular
1978

that of 1967,

and in

always

1982.

In

translated into

Matson,

1984).

to

more water

recent invasions of Lebanon in

this, the

greater water

Therefore, it

access

in any of the Arab-Israeli Wars, in

and the more

spite of

that

outcome of these wars has

resources for

appears that in

Israel (Naff and

these three wars there

had been a "hidden agenda" that reflects Israel's expanding water needs
and interests.
real

and

This becomes a complicating or

comprehensive

understanding

hence making its resolution

of

a blurring factor to a

the Arab-Israeli conflict,

exceedingly difficult.
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The foreign policy

objective of Israel toward Lebanon
security
the

and "Peace

scale,

is always defined in the context of

For Galilee",

carnage,

and

destruction

objective, it has largely failed.
belt"

of

1978

has

Israel's northern region.

been

caused

in

pursuit

Despite
of

this

That not withstanding, the "security

bolstered.

Why? What stage of the conflict

process is the Lebanese-Israeli water conflict at now?
The "security belt" could be
long-standing
position of
it

hydraulic

viewed as a staging platform toward a

objective.

The

water

status Q U O testing, reflection,

will choose

a coercive,

conflict is now at a

and planning, after which

non-coercive, or

an accommodating policy

approach. The water conflict is currently stagnating and diverging from
the process

of conflict model (Fig.

2.1). This will be

the motif of

the discussion in the following pages.
***

***

***

5.5 A Revised Model of Conflict Process
There

appears

to

be

a

number

of

inconsistencies

between the

theoretical model of conflict process as derived and defined in Chapter
Two

(Figures

developed in
the

water

proposed
balancing

2.1

and

changes,

between
which

of power
of

intervention

the
of

deletion

of

largely

structure

states

in

a

case
In

Lebanon

phase (ie.

strategic resources,
the

the

Chapters Three and Four.
conflict

influence

2.2), and

particular, four aspects of

the

third phase),

starting at the

are (1)

the broadening

country

(3) the introduction of the

"triggers/disrupters"

from

The

model

expectations,

certain
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as discussed and

and Israel are introduced.

affect

of

study

the

to

(2)

the

by-proxy

secure access to

time factor, and (4)
model of "natural"

scarcity-induced conflict over resources.
of conflict process, as depicted in
reflect

more

accurately

Therefore, the earlier model

Figures 2.1 and 2.2, is revised to

the

naturally-occurring resource scarcity.

conflict

process

during

a

So this section sets to discuss

these changes and introduces these revisions in Figures 5.1 and 5.2.

5.5.1

The Factor of Time in The Conflict Process

Resource, scarcity does not
always lead

to violent conflict.

common denominator, time.
affects

the structure

behavior.

befall a nation
Both of

instantly nor does it

these propositions have one

The real or perceived duration of a scarcity

of expectations

in a

state thus affecting its

Even in some extreme cases of resource scarcity, such as the

1973 oil crisis, the boycotted

states responded to the same (and would

to a similar) event in relatively predictable ways.

So if the 1973 oil

crisis was perceived to be long-lasting, the affected countries, led by
the

most advantaged and

secured

access to

perhaps oil dependent,

the oil

fields of

study, some regional instability
disorder would
paying

to

the Middle

their

East.

In this case

and a limited degree of international

have been, for the industrialized

maintain

would have coercively

advantaged

status.

world, a price worth
In

cases

of sudden

scarcity of strategic resources, which is usually a result of a boycott
or

a blockade, coercion

resources.

is often used

Similarly, perceiving and

to allow for

the free flow of

fearing water shortages, Israel

responded militarily to her neighbour's plan in 1964 to divert the head
waters of the Jordan river.

107

Figure 5.1

REVISED PROCESS OF CONFLICT MODEL
Resolution

/

Latent

Conflict

V

State; ideology;
values; status.
Opposing attitudes.

II

Conflict

Disruption
Conflict
manifestation

Disrupted i
Expectations)

Initiation
•

Change; awareness;
manifestation of
opposing interests.

Situation
of uncertainty;
Will-to-conflict;
preparations.

Phase

^

3

J

Incremental change
in new structure
of expectations.

Balancing of Power
Coercive:
non coercive:
accomodations

Balance of Power
Credibility:
interest:
capability

Time
Policy influenced by the changing structure of expectations.

Status quo;
New structure
of expectations.

Fortunately, oil
relatively

brief

shortages were perceived as
socio-economic

outweighed

the coercive

associated

with it.

temporary. Hence the

inconveniences

(military) option

Therefore, the

and

sacrifices

with all the uncertainties

onset of

a scarcity

affects the

timing and the type of response to be taken.
After her substantial resource gains in 1967 from the West Bank and
the Golan

Heights, ^srael had no hydrological

excuse to

then covet south Lebanon's

factor

of

time

Israel's earlier

may

completely

reasons nor a political

water resources.

defuse

Therefore, the

a potential conflict (ie. if

resource g a m s had met her

long term needs) or delay

it as was the case with the Lebanese-Israeli water conflict.
Thus the relative time in which a scarcity descends on a country or
a

region

is

an

important

factor

in the conflict process; a factor

neglected by Rummel (1976: 265-288), and not specifically accounted for
in Figure 2.1.

5.5.2

A Triggered Conflict or An Onsetting One?

Using the word "trigger" in

the conflict model (Figure 2.1) refers

to a sudden occurrence that disrupts the structure of expectations, the
status

quo,

However,
context

the

and

the

word

natural

"trigger"

of a naturally

trends
is

in

somewhat

international
misleading

occurring scarcity such

relations.

to use in the

as that with water in

the Middle East.
The

oil

scarcity.
depletion
This

boycott
On

the

of
other

in the Middle

causes

a

"real",

1973

created

hand,

while

East takes place
gradually

an artificial and a perceived
largely

within the natural process.

onsetting,

109

human-induced, water

and in some regions an

irreversible

water

scarcity.

Thus

"triggers/disrupters"

are

inapplicable to the revised model (Figure 5.1).
In

the context of

this case study,

the reason (or "trigger") for

Israel's creation of the "security belt" could be explained as one step
in

Israel's

long

resources.

term

Israel's

planning

early

structure

of

expectations

reflected

in

her

and

to

gradually acquire greater water

close

in,

and

resource-induced

monitoring

water

of

needs

policies.

the

changing

of the country are

They are "pre-emptive"

albeit disguised policies to secure access to new water sources for the
"drier" years ahead.

5.5.3

Status-quo Testing and The Structure of Expectations.

The

resource demands

expectations
and

in it are

quantity.

adversely

Severe

affecting

of a

resource

the

a disadvantaged one.

one)

that

resources

has

a

and the structure of

constantly changing, both

overall

scarcities are less likely to
by

given population

have

capability

of

the

potential

of

a state. Hence such

be tolerated by an advantaged state than

So a state

relatively

often relies on

shortages

in terms of quality

small

(especially a rapidly developing
territorial

resource imports to

the case of water in the Middle

base

and/or scarce

satisfy its needs.

In

East, it is by and large regarded as a

scarce and a non-tradable commodity.
Since

naturalIv

occurring

states, they have ample time to
coping or

resource

scarcities

gradually befall

carefully plan and develop a long term

impact-mitigation strategy. This has

been Israel's approach

to its onsetting water shortages.
The establishment of a "security belt" and the SLA [Figure 5.3] are
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but implementations of proposals that were first spelled out by Israeli
officials in the 1950s.

The

territory that was proposed to come under

Israeli control is the whole area
choice

of

the

Litani

hydraulic

dimension

execution

of Israel's

as

of

a

south of the Litani river.

demarcation

Israel's

line reflects the implicit

interest

early plan

The mere

in

Lebanon.

supports the

The recent

view of Israel's long

term planning strategies.
Israel's
and

decision to enter

its continuous

"security

the balancing of

construction of

belt", represent

a self-serving

another early

so it
the

With

It is, therefore, clear

hydro-strategy is being carefully laid out

is most responsive to the
country.

status-quo in the

but warranted concern about

the dwindling water potential of that country.
that the stage for Israel's

power phase in 1978,

the current

changing structure of expectations in
arrangement, Israel's water interests

could be easily achieved.
Being in control of the water-rich area of south Lebanon, Israel is
currently at the stage of planning how best to ameliorate her onsetting
water

crisis.

One strategy

transformation of the
in southern

been

the structure
gradual.

more self-serving.

explained in two ways.
of expectations,
Israel,
So

underway involves the

current, largely hostile, status-quo environment

Lebanon into one that is

approach can be
in

that is apparently

then,

Lebanon's

water.

what

structure

of expectations is

is

is

First, due

the onset
not

in

noticeable

This Israeli

to the slow change

of the water crisis has
immediate

need

of south

here -is that the dynamic

affecting Israel's policy-making posture

as it plans its path through the balancing of power or interest phase (
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Figure 5.2

A Detailed Section of the Model of Conflict Process: The Enhanced Model

/// Balancing
Status quo
testing

power

Coercive power

"New" status quo
-Force

IV Balance

-time
H

of

of

-*- Accomodation

-onsetting shortages
| -by-proxy intervention
j

Non coercive power-

J

-interest
-capability
-credibility

State Resource Needs and Structure of Expectations: Their Change Influences Policy at This Stage of the Conflict.

power

see

Figure 2.2).

model

of

This is

conflict

an alteration

process

in

Chapter

to the previously discussed
Two,

Figures

2.1 and 2.2).

Second, currently, the costs of taking an openly aggressive approach to
the

water

problem

instability,

and

(such
local

as

international

armed

opposition

condemnation,

that

regional

might sabotage water

diversion schemes) outweigh the benefits, namely water.
Israel's new approach to the balancing of power phase was initiated
in 1978 when it created
to

an "occupation

the "security zone".

by proxy";

an approach

tolerable by both the occupied,

In essence, this amounts

deemed more acceptable and

the occupier, and by the international

body.

On the other hand, the "security belt" and the SLA are the ideal

means

for

the

environment;

creation
one

of

that

a

self-serving

fulfills

Israel's

social

and

water

needs

political
through

accommodation.
There

is a

huge capability

gap between

when Israel, an advantaged country
of power phase, it will
or

part

of

the

in the region, enters the balancing

have the option of the coercive, non-coercive,

the accommodation route.

Israeli approach

The last option

in the "security belt".

new

Lebanon and Israel. Thus

colonizing

or

The

occupation

seems to be the current
choice of this route is
approach

which is both

flexible and self-serving.
If the occupation by proxy
would
secure

have to
its

(Stauffer,
realities in

of southern Lebanon fails, then Israel

directly re-occupy

water
1982 and

needs.

This

1985; Naff

most of
view

happens to.be the dominant one

and Matson,

southern Lebanon and in Israel
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southern Lebanon so it can

1985).

However, current

do not support this view.

Needless

to

say,

Israel.

Whichever

the

military

route

is

option

to

be

is, and will remain, open to

taken

by Israel, it would be a

reaction to the rate of change in its structure of expectations.
There is -a mechanism of socio-political
that

is

under

way

in

the

"security

greater certainty into future
the equilibrium

control and normalization

belt".

This strategy injects

policy decisions which in turn influence

in the balance of power

phase (see Figure 5.2).

This

Israeli approach to water scarcity is one that provides Israel with new
and

reliable sources

of water.

On the

other hand,

it allows Israel

greater control over the shape of the balance of power and the emerging
expectations both domestically and regionally.
As

a result

of the

above, when

water demand reaches a critical
the

self-created

(with relatively
resources
example,

status

stage, Israel could then easily "test"

quo

in

the "security belt", and peacefully

minor opposition) acquire greater

from this area.
the

the structure of expectations of

benefits

In a prolonged

of

the

and reliable water

case of severe drought, for

"security belt" will become apparent.

This suggests that the water conflict has not yet been through the full
cycle

of the

conflict process,

but is

"stalled" in the balancing of

power phase, at the stage of status-quo testing.

5.6

Summary
The first

the

section of this chapter showed

initiation of

conflict phases

of the

that both the latent and
conflict process model (as

depicted in Fig. 2.1) accurately confirm the conflict over water in the
Middle
These

East,
two

most

phases

recently
explain

manifested
the

between

historical
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Israel and Lebanon.

evolution

of

the

water

conflict, and how it developed over the years up until 1978.
Israel's creation of the "security

zone" in 1978 propelled it into

the balancing of power phase where it is now stagnating.
phase,

the

water

conflict

starts

to

diverge

from

In this third
the process of

conf 1 ict model.
The second section of this chapter is devoted to the revised model
as shown

in Figures 5.1 and 5.2.

section are the following.
for the purpose of

First, states' by-proxy intervention abroad

achieving resource-related objectives constitute an

implicitly condoned and flexible
occupation-by-proxy
self-serving status
meant to

The modifications discussed in this

of

approach to foreign policy.

southern

Lebanon

quo environment, is a

be activated when a "real"

The impact-mitigation approach

and

her

Israel's

making

of

a

long-term strategy which is

water crisis befalls the country.

to resource scarcity followed currently

by Israel is conceptually supported by Gurr (1985: 73). He notes that

Future
scarcities of
domestic sources
of supply and
uncertainty of foreign sources will tempt some rich states to
use their political and military power to ensure safe and
cheap sources of supply in the Third and Fourth Worlds.
Conquest may not be necessary; intervention to install and
provide military backing for client elites may achieve the
same effect.
This

"by-proxy"

significant role
in the process

illustrated

scarcity.

to

have

an

important
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5.2,

plays

a

this point is neglected
Second,

deemed inappropriate to be used in

occurring resource

appears

Figure

of conflict model, Figure 2.1.

completely neglected by Rummel (1976)
Two,

in

in this case study. However,

word "trigger" is
naturally

approach.

Third,

the use of the
the context of a

the factor of "time",

and by the discussion in Chapter
role

in

the conflict process.

Fourth,

the

structure

of

expectations

shaping the hydro-strategists' policies
of power phase.
2.2) reflect

a significant role in

of Israel within the balancing

These deviations from the earlier model (Figs. 2.1 and

the distinguishing nature of

scarcity and the policy (conflict)
the

plays

deviations are in

a slowly onsetting resource

response to it.

part due to

On the other hand,

the uniqueness of

the case study:

the general aridity of the region; the geopolitical setting which makes
t

for

a lack

of cooperation

between the

affected states; and the long

term policy planning on the part of Israel.
The model of conflict process
the

once

forgotten

contributor

sheds light on, and partly confirms,
to

Lebanon, namely conflict over water.
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hostilities

between

Israel and

C H A P T E R

SIX

Summary and Conclusions

In

the

resource

Middle

for which

East,

water

demand is

is

a

rising.

scarce
This

and an over-exploited

problem is

amplified to

dangerous proportions in the state of Israel as water scarcity seems to
have

induced conflicts between

recently

with Lebanon.

Against this

long-standing interest in the
was discussed

that country and

her neighbours, most

background and knowing Israel's

Litani river of Lebanon, conflict theory

and tested to ascertain if

water scarcity in Israel was

an inducing factor to its occupation by proxy of the water-rich area of
south Lebanon, the "security zone."
Many Israeli officials, including

"water hawks" like Ariel Sharon,

continue to speak of ceasing the Litani river

Others believe that the

Litani is the only available water source which will permit the current
level of water consumption to continue.
A de-emphasis of agriculture, a
reduction

of

could ease the

its

subsidies

are

realistic pricing of water and the
examples of domestic responses that

water problem, and lead to a
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more efficient use of the

resource.
1970s,

But these are

a gradual

defeated

by the

responses that are

increase of

water prices

powerful agricultural

rarely considered. In the
was introduced only to be

lobby.

This

reflects (1) the

lack of political will to implement austere water policies, and (2) the
country's ideological commitment to

agriculture; a fact established in

Chapter Four.
Although
1978, it

Israel has been

in control of

has yet to openly divert

charges that Israel has a "hidden
seeking

to

boundaries

achieve
of the

byzantine nature

the

the "security zone" since

the Litani river. Lebanon, however,
water agenda", and is, at long last,

cherished

Jewish state

Zionist

up to

goal

of

the Litani

of politics in the Middle

expanding

river.

the

Due to the

East, it is very difficult

to refute "conspiracy" theories.
Pronouncements
water

policy

by

appear

Israeli
to

officials,

support

the

agenda".

A few months after

former's

Minister of

that his

country (Israel) is not seeking

and the country's declared

existence

of

a "hidden water

Israel's invasion of Lebanon in 1982, the

Science and

Technology, Yuval

Neeman, asserted

to divert the Litani because

utilization of the river's water inside Lebanon has reduced its flow to
a "trickle",

thus not worth diverting (Naff

and Matson, 1984: 76-81).

But the Minister added that if Lebanon wants to sell some of its water,
Israel would be interested

in purchasing it.

that Israeli scientists' seismic
in Lebanon proved that it

Neeman also acknowledged

soundings and their extensive surveys

is technically feasible to divert the Litani

into the Jordan river system.
In 1984, large tracts of land

near the Litani river's flow area in
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south

Lebanon

were

cordoned

heightened Lebanon's
government
alleged

off

complained

to

the

United

"water-diverting

Litani";

Israeli army; an act that

an

resources.

The Lebanese

Nations Security Council about

activities"

by

Israel.

Lebanon's

stated (UN Chronicle. Vol.21, 1984: 12-13)

that "Israel had been digging a
the

the

concerns over its water

representative to the U.N.

of

by

tunnel that could absorb all the water

allegation

that

was

denied

by

the

Israeli

representative.
According to Naff and Matson (1984), Israel is planning to increase
the

storage

capacity

of

lake

Tiberias

and to add a fourth pumping

station to the country's National Water Carrier.

The implementation of

such plans will make Israel technically ready to receive the additional
waters

of the

Litani river;

such plans

will also

confirm Lebanon's

worst fear.
The end
the

of the civil war

reconstruction and development

higher standard of living.
this

in Lebanon will signal

thesis, a number

exploiting

nearly

all

Thus,

of

its

realistic and immediate

foreign one,

likely lead to

demand for water will skyrocket.

of conclusions were

adversely affecting the quality
only

period, which will

the beginning of

reached.

replenishable

namely by diverting Lebanon's

First, Israel is

sources of water, thus

of coastal aquifers.
response to severe

In

Second, Israel's

water shortages is a

Litani river.

Third, this

river is of primary importance to the development of south Lebanon, and
to

the unity

of the

ailing and

battered state

of Lebanon.

Fourth,

after testing

the process of conflict model

against the case study, a

refined model

is derived.

accurately the process of

It reflects more
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international

conflict

over

naturally

(slowly)

onsetting

resource

scarcities.
This thesis established that the "security zone" arrangement, under
the circumstances, is a flexible one allowing Israel a number of policy
options all

of which lead to its

access to Lebanon's water resources.

Knowing this, future research should investigate other luring resources
or

benefits

(such

as

human

arrangement.

If such research

could

strengthen

either

or

Future research should also

and

economic/trade

uses the same
weaken

the

resources) to this

conceptual approach, it

conclusions of this thesis.

study the political and economic viability

of Lebanon if it was to lose the Litani river.
In a broader study on this subject, A broader study of this subject
should

consider

resources, cheap

Israel's

dependence

on,

or

labour force, and the captive

"need"

of

the

water

market of the occupied

territories (the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and the Golan Heights), and how
this affects

the prospects of a comprehensive

larger Arab-Israeli conflict.
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peace settlement to the
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